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 ABSTRACT 
 
  
 On 14 September 2007, after failing to find a 'White Knight' to take over its business, 
Northern Rock bank turned to the Bank of England ('the Bank') for a liquidity lifeline. 
This was duly provided but failed to quell the financial panic, which manifested itself in 
the first fully-blown nationwide deposit run on a UK bank for 140 years. Subsequent 
provision of a blanket deposit guarantee duly led to the (eventual) disappearance of the 
depositor queues from outside the bank's branches but only served to heighten the sense of 
panic in policymaking circles. Following the Government's failed attempt to find an 
appropriate private sector buyer, the bank was then nationalised in February 2008. 
Inevitably, post mortems ensued, the most transparent of which was that conducted by the 
all-party House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee. And a variety of reform 
proposals are currently being deliberated at fora around the globe with a view to patching 
up the global financial system to prevent a recurrence of the events which precipitated the 
bank's illiquidity. 
 This article briefly explains the background to these extraordinary events before 
setting out, in some detail, the tensions and flaws in UK arrangements which allowed the 
Northern Rock spectacle to occur. None of the interested parties – the Bank, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury – emerges with their reputation intact, and the 
policy areas requiring immediate attention, at both the domestic and international level, 
are highlighted. Some reform recommendations are also provided for good measure, 
particularly in the area of formal deposit protection. 
 
JEL classification: E53; E58; G21; G28. 
 
Keywords: UK banks; banking regulation and supervision; central banking; deposit 
protection. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Of all the spillover effects from the US sub-prime crisis, the run on Northern Rock, the 
first in the UK for over 140 years, is by far the most transparent and worrying for the UK 
authorities. It exposed the tensions  between central banks with respect to the appropriate 
line to be taken on the provision of liquidity support facilities, the difficulties inherent in 
the UK's "tripartite arrangements" for dealing with banking crises, defects in UK banking 
regulation/supervision and the glaring flaws in UK deposit protection arrangements. It also 
revealed just how fragile the UK banking system actually is today, thereby shaking the 
complacency of politicians, bankers and regulators alike and undermining confidence in 
the UK financial system, with potentially calamitous effects for the broader UK economy. 
For these reasons, it is extremely important to analyse why these events unfolded and what 
can be done to prevent a repetition. 
THE US SUB-PRIME CRISIS : SPILLOVER EFFECTS FOR THE UK 
 
 
 
The downturn in the US housing market, the connecting collapse in security prices 
associated with the sub-prime sector of the market [i.e. those securities, such as residential 
asset-backed mortgages (RABM) and collaleralised debt obligations (CDOs), 
contaminated by defaults arising from "self-certificated" mortgages or mortgages 
otherwise granted on the basis of a high multiple of earnings or as a generous proportion 
(often 100 per cent plus) of the market valuation] and the subsequent global loss of 
confidence in asset-backed securities (ABS) and  other marketsi have had ripple effects in 
the UK. The direct exposure of UK banks and other financial institutions, however, has 
been fairly limited.ii But this has not allowed the UK financial system to emerge 
unscathed. The prime source of contagion has come through the international interbank 
market where banks have proved very reluctant to lend to each other, even at penal rates. 
This situation has arisen because of the banks' need to hoard cash to meet the contingent 
liquidity claims of their off-balance-sheet vehicles which now find they are unable to fund 
themselves in the traditional wholesale markets (e.g. the asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) market) because of the uncertainty about their solvency given their exposure to 
sub-prime securities. Additionally, given the lack of transparency in the market place 
about where the sub-prime risks actually lie, and concerns about the likely scale of losses 
being nursed by prospective counterparties, mutual distrust has set in, causing the market 
to seize up. These severe liquidity shortages are reflected in abnormally high spreads 
between three months money and official Bank Rates, and have led to central banks 
around the globe providing additional liquidity to the markets through a variety of special 
funding initiatives (see Table 1). Their intention is to limit the potentially-wider damage 
that could be wrought upon the real economy as liquidity shortages give way to a credit 
squeeze and lending rates edge up and lending volumes fall, and not just in mortgage 
markets. Tighter liquidity can also threaten insolvency for institutions over-exposed to the 
wholesale markets as a source of funds; and individual insolvencyiii can soon spread to a 
wider community if depositor/investor panic sets in. Such then were the forces which were 
to wreak so much damage on the UK financial system and expose its inherent fragility. 
THE NORTHERN ROCK CRISIS 
 
 
 
The events leading up to and encapsulating the Northern Rock crisis are chronicled in 
Table 2. According to its mid-term balance sheet for 2007, the assets of the UK's eighth 
largest bank and fifth largest mortgage lender stood at £113.5 billion at the end of June, 
with mortgages comprising £87.9 billion. Revealingly, only £30.1 billion of liabilities was 
represented by customer deposits; and shareholders equity amounted to £1.95 billion. The 
balance sheet starkly reveals the strategy of the bank which distinguished it from the other 
UK mortgage lenders. With only 72 branches to its name, its retail customer base was 
limited, causing it to rely heavily on wholesale markets for its funding.iv As an arch 
exponent of the "originate and distribute" school, Northern Rock's business model was to 
expandv through the use of securitisation (of its mortgage pool) and other secured 
borrowing. Whilst such a strategy delivered an industry-beating cost-to-income ratio of 
around 30 per cent, it always represented "an accident waiting to happen". 
 
 Investor concerns over Northern Rock soon came to the surface once the sub-prime 
turmoil hit the US financial system, with astute investors correctly predicting the 
subsequent trading woes that were to hit Northern Rock as the interbank and covered bond 
markets ground to a halt. Massive short-selling of Northern Rock's stock – at one stage 
there was no physical stock left to borrow to facilitate such transactions – and an end-June 
profits warning saw the share price halve from its February 2007 peak. By August the 
bank knew the game was up, with no immediate prospect of the credit squeeze ending. As 
noted above, banks hoarded cash in the expectation that they would be called upon to 
honour the contingent lines of liquidity previously agreed with their off-balance-sheet 
conduits which were now denied funding,vi and due to uncertainty about where the sub-
prime losses lie.vii Accordingly, it entered into negotiations with a number of potential 
buyers, duly keeping the Bank of England and the FSA fully informed. Failure to secure a 
firm bid,viii however, drove it into the arms of the Bank of England, with the latter 
announcing, on 14 September 2007 (the original intention was to make the announcement 
on 17 September but leaks on the impending announcement necessitated bringing the date 
forward), that it was providing an emergency line of credit to Northern Rock to allow it to 
continue operating. Following confirmation from the FSA that the bank was solvent, the 
decision to offer official assistance was taken to reassure the bank's depositors and prevent 
a wider systemic crisis. Under the open-ended facility (the original facility agreed on 14 
September was replaced by a wider facility on 11 October), the bank is charged a 
(undisclosed) penal rate and is able to use mortgages and mortgage-backed securities and 
other assets as collateral to access the loan. The Bank, in turn, is indemnified against any 
losses and other liabilities arising from its support by the Treasury. 
 
 In the event, however, such action proved insufficient to reassure depositors – the 
mentioning of "last resort" funding appeared to induce just the opposite response – thereby 
threatening wider contagion. As a result, on 17 September 2007, the Treasury announced a 
full guarantee of all existing Northern Rock deposits in an attempt to stem the nationwide 
run on the bank which had seen over £2 billion (later increased to over £12 billion) 
withdrawn in a matter of days, and restore financial confidence. The guarantee (which was 
extended to include existing and renewed unsecured wholesale funding on 20/21 
September and covered bonds and derivatives not backed by mortgage collateral on 18 
December – see House of Commons, 2008a, p.131-132, para.350 for further details) is due 
to last for as long as the current financial turmoil persists, and will be extended to other 
depositors if any further UK banks encounter similar difficulties. Thus, not only is 
Northern Rock continuing to operate as a commercial entity with a state guarantee, but the 
whole of the UK banking system's deposit base has now been effectively underwritten by 
UK taxpayers. The belated provision of the blanket guarantee duly caused the queues to 
quickly disappearix with the Chancellor subsequently announcing, on 1 October 2007, an 
increase in the level of depositor protection to £35,000x and a review of deposit protection 
arrangements (HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, 2007). 
 
 Whilst all this has been happening, the House of Commons' Treasury Select 
Committee has held hearings into the affair, interrogating, in turn, the major protagonists. 
The first to endure their wrath and ire were senior officials from the Bank of England, 
including the Governor Mervyn King. The Governor was asked, inter alia, to explain his 
volte face on the provision of liquidity to the market – see below – and the background to 
the Northern Rock fiasco, and to give his views on the workings of the tripartite 
arrangements. Subsequently to this, senior FSA officials received a similar grilling but, 
whilst accepting that their monitoring of Northern Rock was, in some ways, "inadequate" 
(see below), they too refused to criticise the workings of the tripartite arrangements. 
Finally – the interrogation of the Treasury is considered below - senior Northern Rock 
officials themselves were hauled, and mauled, before the Committee but they offered few 
apologies for their actions arguing that their business model was a "good one", their stress 
testing was "sufficient" and that they were the victims of "wholly unexpected events".xi 
They also suggested that had the Bank been willing to extend the liquidity lifeline 
subsequently agreed for Northern Rock to a potential suitor (i.e. Lloyds TSB), the bank 
would not be in the position it finds itself in today. The Bank subsequently (on 17 October 
2007) released a statement claiming that the suitor had demanded a penalty-free loan of up 
to £30 billion for a period of up to two years, something which the Bank argued could not 
be provided, even if it wanted to, given current EU rules on State aid. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL BANKING AND BANK REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION IN THE UK 
 
 
 
What, then, do these events and revelations imply for central banking and bank regulation/ 
supervision in the UK? Conveniently, analysis can be structured under three headings, 
namely central bank liquidity provision and the lender of last resort, the tripartite 
arrangements and deposit protection arrangements, and each area will now be addressed in 
turn. 
 
 
Central Bank Liquidity Provision and the Lender of Last Resort 
Conventional wisdom, as espoused as long ago as 1873 by Walter Bagehot, suggests that, 
faced with a liquidity crisis, central banks should stand prepared to lend, at will, to solvent 
banks, at a penalty rate of interest and against "good" collateral, until the crisis subsides.xii 
The actions taken by the US Federal Reserve ('the Fed') and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) in the second week of August – see Table 1 – satisfy these requirements apart from 
their failure to impose a penalty rate of interest on borrowers. The Bank, however, initially 
refused to offer additional liquidity to the market other than through the "standing facility" 
under which banks can borrow (against eligible collateral), without limit, beyond their 
"target reserve balance" at a penalty of 100 basis points above the official Bank Rate, 
under the modifications to official money market operations introduced in 2006.xiii The 
Bank's stance was eloquently explained in a letter the Governor, Mervyn King, sent to the 
House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee on the 12 September 2007. Whilst 
emphasising the Bank's difficulty in balancing the needs of (short run) financial stability 
against the fear that a wider provision of liquidity would 'undermine the efficient pricing 
of risk' and hence long run stability, the Governor went on assert that proper management 
of "the current turmoil, which has at its heart the earlier under-pricing of risk … should 
not threaten our long-run economic stability." Hence the reason for the Bank's relatively 
sanguine approach. Additionally, the Governor argued that to go further would only 
increase moral hazard and raise the likelihood and intensity of a future financial crisis. As 
he put it: 
 "The provision of large liquidity facilities penalises those financial institutions 
that sat out the dance, increases herd behaviour and increases the intensity of 
future crises." And, 
 "The provision of greater short-term liquidity … would undermine the efficient 
pricing of risk by providing ex-post insurance for risky behaviour … 
encourages excessive risk-taking and sows the seeds of a future financial crisis." 
In other words, a tough line is needed pour encourager les autres. 
 
 The first sign of the Bank retracting from this principled approach came on the 5 
September when, in addition to accommodating the UK commercial banks' increased 
demand for target reserve balances – they increased by around six per cent, to £17.6 
billion, compared with the previous month's figure – it announced that it would allow the 
banks to bid for an additional £4.4 billion of cash the following week, without payment of 
a penalty, if overnight rates remained high. The move was designed to narrow the gap 
between secured overnight rates and the official Bank Rate (5.75 per cent), which had 
peaked at around 75 basis points, and to stimulate interbank lending by increasing the 
banks' liquidity cushion. Unlike the ECB's earlier move on 22 August – see Table 1 – it 
was not intended to influence the three months' rate which, the Bank argued, was beyond 
their control, comprising both liquidity and credit risk premia. In the event, the full £4.4 
billion was taken up by the market on 13 September. 
 Despite this action, the Bank was criticised in some quarters for not doing more to ease 
the market's liquidity crunch. Buiter and Sibert (2007), for example, pleaded for the Bank 
to follow the example set by the Fed and the ECB and to extend the terms of its lending 
from overnight to at least 30 days, and to extend the range of collateral accepted at the 
discount window or in its open market purchases, subject to appropriate 'haircuts'. Finally, 
they argued for an extension in the range of eligible discount window counterparties. The 
inconsistency in central bank policy also led to the ludicrous situation of some UK 
institutions accessing the ECB's more generous facilities through their EU offices (which 
Northern Rock could have done had it acted earlier to put in place the necessary legal 
documentation and collateral in its Irish branch); and some (e.g. HSBC) were even able to 
access the Fed's facilities, through repurchase agreements, as designated "primary dealers" 
(Kane, 2007).xiv [For the more recent actions by the Fed and the ECB see Table 1 and for a 
comparison with the Bank's operations see Bank of England, 2008, pp.58-60.] Clearly, 
more international co-ordination is necessary on this front. 
 
 Having initially stood out from the crowd, the Bank was always on a 'hiding to 
nothing' if unfolding events necessitated a change of tack. And, unfortunately for the 
Bank, just such a change was deemed necessary only two days after publication of the 
Governor's letter to the Treasury Select Committee. For, on the 14 September, following 
assurances given by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) that the bank remained 
solvent, the Bank provided emergency funding to Northern Rock. [Additional lending 
facilities were also made available on 9 October – see House of Commons, 2008a, p.127, 
para.341.] The move was taken to allow the bank to continue operating, to reassure 
depositors of the bank and to prevent wider contagion should a bank run spread. Under the 
arrangements, the bank has access to an unlimited amount of funding (subject to the 
provision of "suitable" collateral) which can now include mortgages and mortgage-backed 
securities for as long as the turmoil persists,xv although a (unrevealed)xvi penalty rate is 
imposed. By the end of December the scale of the Northern Rock's indebtedness to the 
Bank had risen to over £25 billion, the UK taxpayers' total exposure had risen to over £55 
billion (because of the extension in the Treasury's guarantee – see  p.6) and there was with 
no end to the bank's plight nor the credit crunch (see Table 1) in sight. 
 
 Subsequent to this, on 19 September, the Bank announced that it would, after all, lend 
to banks for periods of up to three months and against a wider range of collateral than 
hitherto (to include, as in the Northern Rock case, mortgages for example) under a new 
emergency facility. An initial £10 billion injection of cash, via public auction, was to be 
made the following week, with weekly auctions to follow thereafter until the market 
turmoil subsides. Unlike the Fed however – see the entries in Table 1 for the 18 September 
and 31 October – the Bank (i.e. the Monetary Policy Committee) resisted the temptation to 
cut interest rates early, preferring to wait until the likely impact of the credit crunch upon 
the real economy, and hence future inflation, became clearer. As noted in Table 2, this was 
not deemed necessary until 6 December, when Bank Rate was cut by 25 basis points to 5.5 
per cent. And, following a further 25 basis points cut on 7 February 2008, the Committee 
declined to cut rates again at its March 2008 meeting, citing concerns about the possibility 
of above-target inflation rates in the medium term, which duly materialised with the 
publication of a CPI figure of 3 per cent for April 2008 on 13 May 2008. 
 
 Given this remarkable volte face in such a short space of time it was inevitable that 
questions would be raised about the Governor's judgment, thereby threatening to damage 
the credibility of the central bank.xvii The first opportunity to cross-examine the Governor 
in public came with his appearance before the Treasury Select Committee on the 20 
September, just a day after the announcement of the latest initiative. Lacking his usual self 
assurance, the Governor argued that changing circumstances necessitated a  new approach. 
As outlined in a letter released the previous day by the Bank, the new policy stance arose 
"because the situation has changed – there has been a run on a bank … which threatened 
the reputation of the British banking system" and there is a need "to alleviate the strains on 
the longer-maturity money markets". He went on to argue that the volte face was his 
decision (i.e. not taken under Treasury duress) and that the moral hazard created by the 
second initiative would be limited by the provision of a cap on the scale of funding the 
Bank proposed to supply, both in aggregate and to individual banks, and by the charging 
of a penalty rate of interest (of at least 100 basis points above Bank Rate). 
 
 With respect to the Northern Rock liquidity lifeline, the Governor argued that his 
preferred course of action [not universally shared and deemed impractical by the FSA 
(House of Commons, 2008a, p.56, para.123), although the Chancellor has since announced 
he will consider revising the regulatory framework to allow for such a possibility and the 
Treasury Committee has endorsed its use in specified circumstances (House of Commons, 
2008a, p.86, para.215)] was a covert rescue operation by another bank but this had been 
stymied by a serious of legislative obstacles. Specifically, the Takeover Code, given a 
legislative footing in the Companies Act 2006, and the EU's 'Market Abuse' Directive 
(2005) prevented a secret takeover; whilst the insolvency regime enshrined in the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (which requires the freezing of bank accounts in the face of 
insolvency, thereby delaying compensation to depositors) and the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme of 2001 (which only provided full protection on the first £2,000 of 
a depositor's funds) conspired to make a nationwide run on Northern Rock rational. 
 
 Whilst you have to have some sympathy with the Governor's predicament, many argue 
that the Governor's initial 'high brow' approach was naïve and always likely to be 
overtaken by events. Moreover, his preferred solution for handling the Northern Rock 
crisis has been openly challenged, even accepting the legitimacy of the legal advice he 
apparently received.xviii Additionally, there are those who argue, including the senior 
management of Northern Rock, that had the Bank adopted the tactics revealed on 19 
September much earlier in the day, like its counterparts in Europe, Northern America and 
Asia, Northern Rock's very need for a liquidity lifeline would have been obviated; a clear 
case of "too little, too late". The Bank has since refuted the latter claim arguing that a 
"massive" injection of liquidity would have been necessary to achieve this result. Finally, 
the Bank has also rebutted the claim that it blocked Lloyds TSB's attempted takeover of 
Northern Rock pointing out that it was, in fact, the Chancellor (albeit with the agreement 
of the Bank) who took the decision. 
 
 Whatever the respective merits of the arguments debated, the Treasury Select 
Committee was unconvinced by the Bank's explanationsxix and announced a formal 
enquiry into the Northern Rock affair, the results of which were published on 24 January 
2008 (see below). Moreover, in the event, there were no takers for the newly-proffered 
funds at either the auction held on 26 September or in subsequent weeks. Whether this 
reflects an underlying improvement in banks' liquidity positions, the costly nature of the 
funding or a reluctance by borrowers to be stigmatised by taking advantage of it, nobody 
is too sure. But it is clear some small banks still faced funding problems in the wholesale 
markets; and the market's appetite for the auction of three-month money announced on 12 
December – see Table 2 – suggests that funds, at the right price, are still widely needed 
and that borrowers' fears of being stigmatised if they avail themselves of the special 
funding facilities may be waning. Indeed, this appears to be one of the positive outcomes 
of the co-ordinated central bank action announced on 12 December, together with a 
narrowing of the spreads between three-month inter-bank rates and official rates, although 
some (e.g. Buiter, 2007) regard the event as providing "empty gestures". 
The Tripartite Arrangements 
The so-called 'tripartite arrangements' (Bank of England, 1998) relate to the arrangements 
put in place in October 1997 to deliver financial stability by ensuring close co-operation 
and co-ordination between the interested parties (the Bank, the Treasury and the FSA), 
especially in the event of a financial crisis, following the Labour government's decision to 
strip the Bank of responsibility for banking supervision (Hall,1997). The involvement of 
the Bank is necessary because of its continuing lender of last resort function and its 
responsibility for "maintaining overall financial stability",xx whilst the FSA's presence is 
obviously required as the main regulatory/supervisory authority and the first port of call 
for any financial firm which gets into difficulties. Finally, the Treasury is primarily 
responsible for the international structure of regulation and the regulation which governs 
it, and has to be consulted if there is a perceived need for an official "support operation". 
Basically then, in the case of the liquidity lifeline thrown to Northern Rock, the FSA's role 
was to determine whether or not the bank was solvent, following an appeal for help from 
the bank; the Bank, as well as the FSA, had to determine whether its failure posed a 
systemic threat; and the Treasury, as keeper of the nation's purse strings, had to decide, 
following the receipt of advice from the former bodies, whether to authorise a support 
operation. 
 
 Although both the FSA and the Bankxxi have been at pains not to criticise the working 
of the arrangements during their interrogations at the hands of the Treasury Select 
Committee, outside commentators have taken a different view. Moreover, the Treasury, in 
its evidence before the Committee (given on 25 October), has indicated that it will seek 
clarification, in a future draft, of its power to ultimately determine the outcome of tripartite 
talks in a wider set of circumstances than it believes is currently covered by the 
agreements. (Should the Bank have bowed to FSA/Treasury pressure to provide additional 
liquidity earlier?) Additionally, like the Bank, it is keen that the central bank is involved 
more directly in the  monitoring of individual banks' financial health, notwithstanding the 
FSA's broader remit in this area. 
 
 Intriguingly, the challenge to the tripartite arrangements posed by the Northern Rock 
episode suggests that one of the main reasons for separating monetary policy from banking 
supervision – to protect the integrity of the monetary authority in the face of inevitable 
bank failures (Hall, 2001a) - may have been overplayed. This is because the handling of its 
residual role of lender of last resort is open to challenge, as in this case, exposing the Bank 
to a possible loss of credibility through this route. Moreover, there are those central banks 
who continue to argue (e.g. the Fed and the Bank of Japan, although they both have vested 
interests!) that continuing central bank involvement in banking supervision is essential, 
not least because it provides direct access to important market information that can prove 
invaluable in crisis situations. Would the Bank's earlier knowledge of problems at 
Northern Rock have precipitated an earlier change of heart on its behalf?xxii 
 
 
Supervision by the FSA 
As the body currently responsible for UK banking supervision, the FSA clearly has a 
number of questions to answer in relation to its treatment of Northern Rock, as it 
acknowledged before the Treasury Select Committee (FSA, 2007b). First and foremost, 
given what the FSA now recognises as an "extreme" funding model where around 75 per 
cent of its resources are accessed from the wholesale money market, why didn't the FSA 
force Northern Rock to carry out a stress test for a market shutdown of the type which 
materialised in August? Did the FSA insist on additional safeguards being met given the 
bank's clear violation of liquidity norms concerning the diversification of liquidity 
sources?xxiii If so, what were they? Why didn't the FSA know that Northern Rock had only 
secured $2.3 billion of liquidity insurance (House of Commons, 2008a, p.17, para.26)? 
Did the FSA ever raise with the management of the bank the wisdom of growing their 
mortgage book so rapidly in a maturing market? And why didn't the FSA spot that 
Northern Rock was not only a "high impact" bank but also a high risk operation (an 
"accident waiting to happen"), requiring full scale reviews more frequently than every 
three years (the next one was due in 2009)? 
 
 Given their expression of concern earlier in the year about a possible tightening of 
credit conditions and the Bank's similar public warnings, the conclusion must be that, in 
the case of Northern Rock, the regulator took its eye off the ball. Clearly, the regulation 
and supervision of bank liquidity will have to be looked at again and its importance raised 
to parallel that of bank capital adequacy assessment, the subject of years of development 
under the Basel II process (Hall, 2004). 
 
Deposit Protection Arrangements 
 
The final area of controversy, admirably highlighted by the nationwide run on Northern 
Rock, concerns the operation of UK deposit protection arrangements. Although these were 
reformed back in 2001, their current operation under the guise of the UK Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme is still deeply flawed. As was pointed out long ago (e.g. 
Hall, 2001b and 2002), this is due in part to the long-standing objection to the 
implementation of such arrangements by the clearing banks (Why should they, as 
conservatively-managed organisations, subsidise their less conservative brethren?) and, 
more recently, to the introduction of the EU guiding Directivexxiv on the subject. The 
latter, for example, placed restrictions on the use of deposit insurance information in 
advertisements (because of fears that this would distort competition), failed to mandate the 
risk-adjustment of premium contributions and set the maximum period for depositor 
compensation at three months, in normal times, without suggesting a minimum. The first 
flaw means that very few people in the EU actually know about the existence of deposit 
protection until a crisis occurs, thereby destroying its potential as a stabilisation device.xxv 
Moreover, once they become aware of the limited de jure protection they actually enjoy, 
they have every incentive to be at the front of the queue. The second flaw, meanwhile, 
results in cross-subsidies occurring (as argued by the clearing banks) and a failure to 
minimise moral hazard (or excessive risk-taking) on behalf of the banks, thereby storing 
up future trouble for the banking system, as is only too well illustrated by the savings and 
loans crisis which struck the US in the 1980s (Kane, 1985). Finally, the third flaw means 
that, because of the excessively high liquidity costs imposed by the  enforced wait for 
compensation, depositors again have every incentive to join in deposit runs, as again 
proved to be the case in the Northern Rock fiasco. 
 Of course, EU Member States have always had the freedom to improve upon the 
Directive's arrangements, which only stipulated minimum requirements, but all too few 
have bothered. As regards the UK, for example, public awareness of the Scheme is (or 
was!) extremely low, risk-related premium are not imposed and compensation delays are 
likely to exceed the normal three month maximum, because of our insolvency 
arrangements. Moreover, in an attempt to limit the moral hazard for depositors (i.e. to 
ensure they have an incentive to monitor, however difficult, the recipient banks) UK 
policymakers decided to apply the principle of co-insurance, only offering 100 per cent 
protection on the first £2,000 of deposits, with the next £33,000 being subject to a 10 per 
cent haircut. Whilst this is desirable on efficiency and long-term stability grounds it is     
inimical to short-run stability, as the Northern Rock saga so clearly demonstrated. Whilst 
the Government's subsequent decision to do away with co-insurance may reduce the 
likelihood/intensity of future deposit runs, a more carefully thought out reform, addressing 
in particular the issues of moral hazard and agency/principal conflict (Hall, 2003), is 
urgently required. This must also embrace a reconsideration of our insolvency 
arrangements, as the authorities recognise (HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, 
2007), and examination of the merits of linking deposit insurance arrangements to "prompt 
corrective action" – type programmes, as is undertaken in the US and Japan (Hall, 1993). 
[See also Nieto and Wall, 2006.] 
THE UK AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE 
 
Response by the Bank of England 
As noted earlier, the Bank has been widely accused of tardiness, at least compared with its 
central bank counterparts elsewhere in the World, in the provision of emergency liquidity 
to the UK banking system and of a lack of imagination in the conduct of its open market 
operations. It has also faced the charge of failing to co-ordinate its actions with those of 
other central banks and was ridiculed for its abrupt volte face in September 2007 with 
respect to the terms on which it was willing to provide emergency liquidity. The Bank's 
initial defence of its actions has also already been noted; its tardiness to act was driven, in 
part, by a desire to limit moral hazard, and due to a belief that the situation was 
manageable with traditional tools. Once it became clear, however, that the picture was 
darkening, and especially after Northern Rock's appeal for liquidity support, it acted 
decisively and imaginatively by extending the period for emergency lending from 
overnight to three months and widening the range of acceptable collateral beyond the 
traditional prime (i.e. with a minimum credit rating of "Aa3") public sector securities. [It 
subsequently introduced a new 'Special Liquidity Scheme' under which it is willing to 
swap up to £50 billion of Treasury Bills for illiquid securities backed by mortgages or 
credit card loans for a period of up to 364 days – see the entry for 21 April 2008 in Table 2 
for further details.]  Moreover, it increased the flexibility of its reserve balance 
management regime, not least by widening the ranges around banks' reserves targets 
within which reserves are remunerated at Bank Rate. If this is perceived as an 
embarrassing volte face, so be it. Additionally, as claimed by the Bank's Governor before a 
hearing of the Treasury Select Committee on 29 November, the Bank can be shown to 
have been marginally more successful than the ECB, and certainly more successful than 
the US Fed, in keeping LIBOR rates close to policy targets; and its actions 
(accommodation of banks' increased demand for reserves was offset, to a degree, by 
smaller short-term open market operations) have resulted in a significant increase (i.e. 
over 42 per cent between August 2007 and April 2008) in the cash reserves held by 
reserves scheme participants, unlike in the Eurozone and the US. And finally, its 
willingness to tackle a perceived year-end funding problem and to participate in the co-
ordinated central bank action announced on 12 December (see Table 1), but agreed, in 
principle, at the G20 meeting held in November in Cape Town – involving a further 
widening in the range of acceptable collateral and a willingness to allow the market to 
determine the price of money, with no minimum rate applying – is evidence of its desire to 
refute the charge of aloofness. [But at the cost of diluting its own balance sheet quality and 
subsidising the weak/reckless relative to the strong/conservative.] Whatever one's views 
on the strength of the Bank's defence, the Bank itself felt sufficiently concerned to 
announce a wide-ranging review of its money market operations on 18 December 2007. 
 
 As for its role in the decision-taking of the tripartite authorities, the Bank, again, has 
been accused of naivety, not least because of the Governor's apparent attempt to shift the 
blame for blocking Lloyds TSB's takeover of Northern Rock on to the Treasury – at least 
that's how the market perceived the comments made in a television interview – and the 
apparent Bank briefing that it was the Treasury which was mainly responsible for the 
delay in reforming the deposit protection arrangements. Away from this "blame game", 
the Bank is supportive of a review of the tripartite arrangements and has no desire to re-
assume responsibility for banking supervision. 
Response by HM Treasury 
As discussed earlier, the Treasury has already taken action to amend the deposit protection 
arrangements and to put in train, with the other tripartite authorities, a wider review of 
such arrangements. [Under the proposals announced by the FSA in November 2007 for 
adoption in April 2008, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme's annual capacity to 
pay out depositors will increase from £2.7 billion to £4.03 billion, to be funded through 
ex-ante contributions from financial intermediaries.] Whether this results in a further 
increase (i.e. beyond the £35,000 limit introduced in October 2007) in the de jure level of 
protection enjoyed by depositors remains to be seen as, contrary to the Chancellor's public 
pronouncement, the British Bankers Association claims a further increase is unnecessary 
as the current level protects over 95 per cent of customer deposits. 
 
 As for its participation in the "blame game", the Treasury has made it abundantly clear 
that the decision to block Lloyds TSB's takeover had the full backing of the Bank. 
Moreover, it is unaware of any overtures from the Bank, at least before August 2007, 
demanding immediate reform of the deposit protection arrangements. 
 
 Finally, and apart from its desire to improve the workings of the tripartite 
arrangements (see p.14), the Chancellor has aired his general views about the nature of 
desired reforms in an interview given to the Financial Times on 3 January 2008 (to the 
consternation of certain MPs!). He is looking for legislative reform in May 2008 to deliver 
the following: enable the FSA (rather than a newly-created body) to intervene promptly in 
the case of a failing bank and allow it to seize and protect depositors' cash in such a 
scenario; provide the FSA with greater powers with respect to the gathering of information 
thereby allowing for effective liquidity adequacy assessment; and create a Cobra-style 
arrangement whereby the Bank and the FSA would advise the Treasury in crisis situations 
but HM Treasury would possess the clear and unambiguous power to make the final 
decision. The formal tripartite proposals for reform were subsequently revealed on 30 
January 2008 in the shape of a consultation paper (see HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of 
England, 2008). 
 
Response by the FSA 
Apart from endorsing the moves to reform the deposit protection, failure resolution, and 
tripartite arrangements, the FSA has also published a discussion paper reviewing liquidity 
requirements for banks and building societies (FSA, 2007c) in the light of its earlier 
acknowledgement of flaws in its assessment regime (see p.15). A consultative paper on the 
subject, with firm proposals, is envisaged for mid-2008. It intends to develop UK policy in 
line with the international work being undertaken by the Basel Committee and the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors but currently envisages the continued use of 
some form of quantitative liquidity requirement and an intensification in the supervision of 
individual firms' stress testing and contingency funding planes as well as their off-balance-
sheet vehicles. [Further insights into the need for reform are contained in Goodhart, 
2007b.] 
 
 Further to this work, the FSA is currently monitoring all wholesale and retail banks 
and deposit-taking institutions more closely under a continuing principles-based 
philosophy, reviewing its risk-assessment and risk-mitigation practices (the results will be 
published in March 2008). Its internal audit division will also deliver a report on the 
lessons to be learnt from the Northern Rock affair by 31 January 2008 (FSA, 2007d), 
although the Treasury Committee would much prefer an independent inquiry (House of 
Commons, 2008a, p.104, para.268). The conclusions will subsequently be made public.xxvi 
And, finally, the FSA has already revealed a shake-up in its operating model (FT, 11 
January 2008), partly in anticipation of the Chancellor's demand for an enhanced role for 
the regulator in bank failure resolution policy and banking supervision more generally. 
A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY 
COMMITTEE'S REPORT 
 
 
 
The Treasury Committee's report on Northern Rock (House of Commons, 2008a) was 
published on 24 January 2008. Its main findings (see pp.3-4 of the Report) can be 
summarised as follows: 
• the directors of Northern Rock were the principal authors of the bank's difficulties 
because of the 'reckless business model' which they pursued; 
• the FSA 'systematically failed in its regulatory duty to ensure Northern Rock would 
not pose a systemic risk'; 
• the Chancellor was right to view Northern Rock as posing a systemic risk to the 
financial system and to authorise the Bank of England's support facility but the 
Tripartite authorities failed to prepare adequately for that support operation and to plan 
in advance for the deposit guarantee eventually introduced; 
• new bank failure resolution policies are needed to insulate taxpayers and small 
depositors from the risks of bank failure; 
• new deposit protection arrangements are needed to ensure, inter alia, prompt release of 
depositors' funds protected under the scheme; 
• reform of the UK's system of bank liquidity regulation is urgently required and cannot 
wait for international agreement; 
• the Tripartite arrangements need reforming to provide clearer leadership and stronger 
powers to the authorities; and 
• a single authority, other than the FSA (because of a need for 'creative tension' within 
the regulatory system), should be given the new powers for handling banks together 
with responsibility for arranging the new Deposit Protection Fund (the Committee's 
preference is for these duties to be performed by a new Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England responsible for Financial Stability). 
 
 As regards the supervisory performance of the FSA, the Committee was scathing in its 
criticisms: 
• the FSA was guilty of systematic failure in its regulatory duties (p.3); 
• it failed to act on warning signs (i.e. rapid growth and share price falls from February 
2007 onwards), failed to tackle fundamental weaknesses in Northern Rock's funding 
model and did nothing to prevent the problems that came to the fore from August 2007 
onwards (p.24, para.42); 
• it was wrong to allow Northern Rock to weaken its balance sheet [via a 'waiver' 
allowing the bank to adopt the 'advanced approach' to assessing capital adequacy under 
Basel II, which subsequently led the bank to increase its dividend payments to 
shareholders] at a time when it itself was concerned about problems of liquidity that 
could affect the financial sector (pp.25/6, para.45); 
• it failed in its duty to ensure that the Board of Northern Rock undertook adequate 
stress-testing (p.29, para.52); and 
• it 'should not have allowed nor ever again allow the two appointments of a Chairman 
and Chief Executive to a "high-impact" institution where both candidates lack relevant 
financial qualifications' (p.33, para.63). 
 
 In summary, the Committee concluded that: 
  'The FSA did not supervise Northern Rock properly. It did not allocate sufficient 
resources or time to monitoring a bank whose business model was so clearly an 
outlier; its procedures were inadequate to supervise a bank whose business grew so 
rapidly … The failure of Northern Rock, while a failure of its own Board, was also 
a failure of its regulator … In the case of Northern Rock, the FSA appears to have 
systematically failed in its duty as a regulator to ensure Northern Rock would not 
pose such a systemic risk, and this failure contributed significantly to the 
difficulties, and risks to the public purse, that have followed.' (p.34, para.66). 
 
 With respect to the actions taken by the Bank of England during the crisis, the 
criticism was more muted. The Bank, nevertheless, was censured for: 
• its pre-occupation with moral hazard concerns during August 2007 (p.44, para.90); 
• its failure to broaden the range of acceptable collateral at an earlier stage in the turmoil 
(p.47, para.97); 
• its failure to properly consider the possibilities for covert support action much earlier 
(p.63, para.42); and 
• its failure to hold high level discussions with Northern Rock about the support facility 
prior to 10 September. 
Moreover, along with the other Tripartite authorities, it was condemned for not: 
• preparing adequately for the support operation (p.3); 
• planning in advance for the announcement of the deposit guarantee (p.3 and p.71, 
para.165); 
• preparing the groundwork to allow for the announcement (that a deposit guarantee 
would be introduced) to be made the morning following the day the decision was taken 
(Sunday, 16 September) before the markets opened (p.72, para.166); 
• acting with sufficient rigour to address weaknesses (i.e. in relation to the handling of 
failing banks) in the legislative framework (ultimately the responsibility of HM 
Treasury) first identified in 2005 and deemed significant enough to require "urgent 
action" by late 2006 (p.109, para.280). 
 
 The Bank, however, was cleared of the charge of unnecessarily blocking a proposed 
takeover of Northern Rock by Lloyds TSB (p.52, para.112); and the Committee was non-
committal on whether the Bank's wider provision of market liquidity earlier in the day (i.e. 
in August) would have obviated Northern Rock's need for emergency support in 
September (p.45, para.95), and on whether more might have been done prior to 10 
September to facilitate a private sector takeover (p.54, para.118). 
 
 In relation to the establishment of a new bank failure resolution regime, the Committee 
endorsed the Bank's earlier call for a new bank insolvency regime but also recommended 
the introduction of "prompt corrective action" (PCA)-type measures – see above. The 
former is necessary to overcome the obstacles to a speedy payout of depositors' funds in 
the event of bank insolvency which currently apply under corporate insolvency law; and 
the latter is required to ensure intervention is more pro-active, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of a distressed bank moving towards insolvency and triggering a call on the 
deposit protection scheme and facilitating the orderly resolution of banks which do fail. As 
regards the former, the Committee favours the introduction of the US-style "Bridge Bank" 
scheme, involving the ring-fencing of insured deposits at a failing bank and "least cost" (to 
the taxpayer!) resolution (see Hall, 1993, ch.5) [House of Commons, 2008a, p.83, 
para.201]. And, with respect to PCA arrangements (ibid., p.80, para.193), the Committee 
calls for the relevant authority to supplement its judgement with a set of quantitative 
triggers (or tripwires) when deciding how and when to intervene in a failing bank. Possible 
contenders for tripwires, as outlined by the British Bankers Association (ibid., p78, 
para.186), are deterioration in financial condition with respect to liquidity, capital, 
earnings and asset quality, suspected or actual fraud, and significant growth in business or 
shift in strategic business planning. The Committee explicitly ruled out a request for 
official support from a bank as a useful trigger, as suggested by the Chancellor, as this 
would occur too late in the day to allow for effective remedial action to be taken. 
Moreover, the Committee recognised that the successful operation of PCA in the UK 
would require improved information-sharing amongst the tripartite authorities (ibid., p.79, 
para.189) as well as the provision of significant additional powers to the relevant authority 
to allow for the prompt collection of all relevant information (ibid., p.80, para.192). 
 
 As for its views on how to reform deposit protection arrangements, the Committee 
argued for the following: 
• the creation of a new Deposit Protection Fund, to cover deposits held with "large" 
deposit-taking institutions, to be funded on an ex-ante basis by contributions from such 
institutions (initially, the Government would set up the Fund, to be re-imbursed by the 
institutions in subsequent years) [ibid., pp.101-102, para.263]; 
• the size of the new Fund should be sufficient to deal with failures of medium-sized and 
even larger banks (from April 2008, the reformed FSCS will still only cover losses of 
up to £4 billion) [ibid., p.77, para.183]; 
• as currently, the non-application of coinsurance on depositors below the de jure limit 
of protection (the moral hazard consequences can be mitigated by the adoption of PCA 
and a new bank insolvency regime and by the application of a modest compensation 
limit) [ibid., p.91, para.227]; 
• continuation, albeit subject to indexation for inflation, of the current de jure limit to 
protection of £35,000 [ibid., p.93, para.233], as should remain the case for the FSCS 
which would continue to deal with all other deposit-taking intermediaries; 
• repayment of insured deposits within a matter of days of the deposit protection scheme 
being called upon [ibid., p.93, para.240]; 
• the introduction of risk-related premia for participating institutions once the Fund has 
been established at the requisite level [ibid., p.103, para.266]; 
• enhanced advertising of the new Scheme, at both the national and regional level, and 
through the display of posters in individual bank branches [ibid., p.96, para.242]; and 
• a re-design of the Scheme to prohibit the offsetting of deposits against customers' 
illiquid liabilities [ibid., p.97, para.251]. 
 
 Finally, with respect to the operation of the Tripartite arrangements, the Committee 
refused to accept that the system worked well, as argued by the FSA, the Chancellor and 
the Governor of the Bank of England. It duly reasoned that a run on a UK bank is not only 
unacceptable but clearly represents 'a significant failure of the Tripartite system' [ibid., 
p.107, para.276]. Notwithstanding this, however, it went on to argue that despite current 
arrangements lacking both a clear leadership structure [ibid., p.110, para.284] and a 
strategy for effective communication with the general public [ibid., pp.111-112, para.289], 
the financial system in the UK would not be well-served by a dismantling of the Tripartite 
arrangements [ibid., p.107, para.277]. Rather it wants to see it reformed, with clearer 
leadership and stronger powers being provided. 
 
 Whilst in agreement with most of the Committee's findings and recommendations – 
see earlier sections to this paper – especially on the reform of failure resolution policies 
where I have long championed the introduction of PCA and changes to the deposit 
protection arrangements similar to those suggested by the Committee (see, for example, 
Hall, 2002), I cannot agree with the allied structural changes proposed [elaborated at 
length in Chapter 8 of the Committee's Report]. To my mind, to create a new post at the 
Bank of England where the incumbent is responsible for both deposit protection and the 
handling of bank failure is a retrograde step. I firmly believe the decision to remove 
banking supervision from the Bank of England was a sound move (see Hall, 2001a), and 
the failure of the Tripartite authorities to come up to scratch with respect to the operation 
of the Memorandum of  Understanding in the Northern Rock case is not an indictment of 
the new arrangements themselves but rather of the people involved [as accepted as a 
possibility by the Committee (p.107, para.276). Rather, I favour the introduction of a new 
agency to function as an independent Deposit Protection Agency to be responsible for 
insuring the depositors of all deposit-taking intermediaries – the deposit sub-scheme of the 
FSCS would go or alternatively be used to cover just credit unions – and the resolution of 
failed banks, as in the US. The FSA would receive the new PCA mandate. Appropriate 
mechanisms would, of course, have to be put in place to deal with the potential 
principal/agent conflict and communication problems thereby created (see Hall, 2002) 
within a four-agency structure. 
A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIPARTITE AUTHORITIES' 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
 
 
The Tripartite Authorities' consultation document of January 2008 (Bank of England, HM 
Treasury and FSA, 2008a) sets out their reform proposals within the confines of five key 
objectives: 
• to strengthen the financial system (both at home and abroad); 
• to reduce the likelihood of banks failing; 
• to reduce the impact of bank failure should it happen; 
• to improve the effectiveness of compensation arrangements; and 
• to strengthen the Bank of England and improve co-ordination between the relevant 
authorities. 
 
 The main reforms proposed under each heading will now be addressed in turn. 
 
To Strengthen the Financial System 
To secure this objective, the Authorities' focus is on strengthening banks' risk management 
(e.g. through better stress testing and improved management of liquidity) and improving 
the functioning of securitisation markets (including measures to improve valuation 
techniques and to address the problems – e.g. conflicts of interest, the information content 
of ratings and over-reliance on ratings by investors – arising from the operation of credit 
rating agencies). The prudential regulation of banks' off-balance-sheet vehicles is also 
addressed under this heading. The Authorities' formal proposals in this area embrace the 
following (Chapter 2, pp.35-36): 
 
 
1. In relation to stress testing: 
 • the FSA will intensify its work with banks to improve stress testing in light of 
recent events; 
 • the Authorities will work with international partners to encourage a stronger 
consensus on the importance of stress testing, in particular at group level and by 
multinational banks; and 
 • the Authorities will work to consider whether the stress-testing standards under 
Basel II are sufficiently robust. 
2. In relation to liquidity regulation: 
 • the Authorities will work with international partners to ensure that liquidity 
regulation standards are consistently high across banking groups, and encourage 
more consistent approaches to liquidity regulation. 
3. In relation to accounting and valuation of structured products: 
 • the Authorities will work with their international counterparts to ensure that firms' 
valuation approaches are consistent with the relevant accounting standards and the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) Basel II prudent valuation guidance; and  
 • the Authorities will work with their international counterparts to ensure that firms' 
valuation approaches are consistent with the relevant accounting standards and the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)/Basel II prudent valuation guidance;  
 • the Authorities will work with their international counterparts to ensure accounting 
standards require adequate disclosure about the uncertainties around valuations, 
their significance for the entity and how these risks are being managed; and 
 • the Authorities will encourage markets to find ways to increase transparency of 
valuation methodologies and, to the extent appropriate, move towards greater 
standardisation of methodologies for valuation. 
4. In relation to credit rating agencies (CRAs): 
 • the Authorities will work with international counterparts in the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) and the EU to look at the role of CRAs in structured finance. The 
Authorities will also support the work of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions' (IOSCO) taskforce on CRAs, which has recently been 
reviewing the applicability of its Code of Conduct for CRAs to structured finance 
business; 
 • the Authorities will keep the development of investor practice in relation to 
structured products under review to determine if further measures are needed to 
assist markets to achieve an appropriate outcome; and 
 • the Authorities will consider the implication for investors in structured products of 
the recommendations of the advisory groups established in September 2007 by the 
US President's Working Group on Financial Markets to improve best practice in 
the operation of hedge funds and the hedge fund working group in the UK chaired 
by Sir Andrew Large. 
5. In relation to transparency of banks and exposure to off-balance-sheet vehicles: 
 • the Authorities will work with their international partners in the FSF and the EU to 
identify whether there remain incentives under the CRD/Basel II framework for 
banks to minimise their regulatory capital requirements by holding assets in SIVs 
and other funding vehicles, and if so whether this might reduce the total amount of 
regulatory capital in the financial system below the level that the Authorities 
consider desirable; and 
 • the Authorities recommend that the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) consider in particular whether reputational risks are properly taken into 
account in decisions about consolidation. 
To Reduce the Likelihood of Banks Failing 
Here, the focus is on strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework in the UK 
and improving the framework governing the provision and disclosure of liquidity 
assistance provided by the Bank of England. The former is deemed to require the 
imposition of new information disclosure requirements on banks to allow the FSA to 
collect the information necessary to allow it, and the other Tripartite authorities, to 
adequately discharge their supervisory/stability obligations. Additional powers of 
intervention are also being sought for the FSA, as well as improved oversight of the 
payment systems. As far as the Bank's provision of emergency liquidity assistance is 
concerned, the authorities are seeking powers to allow the Bank to delay disclosure of 
such action in certain circumstances. Moreover, to facilitate the Bank's operations in the 
financial stability area, the Authorities are seeking statutory immunity for the Bank in 
carrying out such responsibilities as well as the effective realisation of any collateral 
arising from such operations. 
 
 The Authorities' formal proposals in this area comprise the following (Chapter 3, 
pp.46-47): 
1. To improve the regulatory and supervisory framework: 
 • the FSA intends to consult on new rules to require banks to be in a position to 
provide additional evidence to the FSA at short notice that they are meeting 
threshold conditions (as set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000) 
on an ongoing and forward-looking basis; 
 • the Government proposes legislation to ensure that there is no statutory 
impediment to the FSA obtaining information that the Bank of England and HM 
Treasury require for purposes related to financial stability; and 
 • the Government proposes legislation to provide for a flexible framework for 
oversight of payment systems. The Authorities intend to consult further on the 
detail of the regime to be implemented under this framework. 
2. To ensure the Bank of England is able to lend in an effective manner: 
 • the FSA will come forward with a proposal to make a limited clarification to the 
guidance in the Disclosure and Transparency rules; 
 • the Government is seeking views on whether the requirements for a company to 
put charges over its assets on to a register of its own and to register them at 
Companies House should be dis-applied for banks in receipt of liquidity assistance; 
 • the Government proposes legislation to remove the requirement for the Bank of 
England to release weekly returns and will consider other statutory reporting 
requirements related to the Bank of England that have the effect of disclosing 
operations; 
 • the Government proposes legislation granting the Bank of England statutory 
immunity from liabilities in damages arising from acts or omissions in carrying out 
its responsibilities in relation to financial stability and central bank functions; and, 
to the extent necessary, to extend the immunities currently available to the FSA 
and the FSCS in line with their additional powers proposed in this reform; 
 • the Government proposes legislation to ensure that realisation of any collateral 
provided to the Bank of England in connection with carrying out its responsibilities 
in relation to financial stability and central bank functions, is fully effective 
whenever carried out; 
 • the Government proposes legislation so that funds provided by the Bank of 
England are exempted from the calculation of the proportion of building societies' 
funding which arises from wholesale funding; and 
 • the Government proposes legislation to allow building societies to grant floating 
charges to the Bank of England as security. 
 
To Reduce the Impact of Bank Failure 
To enable failing banks to be dealt with in a way which minimises the potential impact on 
financial stability, the Authorities propose fundamental changes to the institutional, legal 
and insolvency arrangements currently applying in the UK. Mirroring the 
recommendations of the Treasury Committee, they duly propose the introduction of a 
'special resolution regime' including, inter alia, a 'bridge bank' scheme and a bespoke 
'bank insolvency procedure'. [Their They also focus on the practical measures that the 
banks themselves can take to lessen the impact of their failure. Their detailed proposals are 
as follows (Chapter 4, pp.64-65): 
1. In relation to a special resolution regime, the Government: 
 • proposes legislation to introduce a special resolution regime for banks; 
 • proposes legislation to give the Authorities the power to direct and accelerate 
transfers of banking business to a third party, in order to facilitate a private sector 
solution; 
 • proposes legislation to allow the Authorities to take control of all or part of a bank 
(or its assets and liabilities) through a 'bridge bank', as is possible in the United 
States and Canada; 
 • is also seeking views on whether, building on the FSA's existing power to appoint 
an expert, the Authorities should have the power to appoint a suitable person or 
'restructuring officer' to carry out the resolution; 
 • would welcome views as to whether the tools above achieve sufficient control of a 
failing bank, or whether legislation to allow the Authorities to take a bank into 
temporary public sector ownership as a last resort should be introduced; 
 • proposes legislation, should it become apparent that pre-insolvency resolution is 
not feasible, or that immediate closure of the bank was appropriate, to introduce a 
'bank insolvency procedure' to facilitate fast and orderly payment of depositors' 
claims under the FSCS; 
 • would welcome views on how best to control a bank's entry into insolvency 
proceedings; and 
 • is consulting on whether all the tools within the special resolution regime should 
be available to building societies as well as banks. 
2. Setting out requirements on banks: 
 • the Government is seeking views on whether banks should contribute to funding 
the special resolution regime. As part of this, it is considering whether to amend 
the FSMA to allow the FSCS to contribute to the funding of the special resolution 
regime; 
 • the FSA intends to work with banks to ensure that agency banks have contingency 
plans in place in the event that their sponsor banks fails; and 
 • the Government proposes to introduce a power enabling it to make secondary 
legislation in relation to financial collateral arrangements. 
 
To Improve the Effectiveness of Compensation Arrangements 
The focus of attention under this heading is a desire to improve consumers' confidence in 
and understanding of the compensation arrangements as well as to increase their cost-
effectiveness. The search for remedies duly addresses, inter alia, the issues surrounding 
compensation limits, coverage, and speed of repayment of depositors' funds as well as 
measures designed to increase consumer awareness, as set out immediately below 
(Chapter 5, pp.83-84): 
1. In relation to compensation limits and coverage: 
 • the FSA intends to consult on changes to the FSCS compensation limit and other 
factors used in the compensation calculation; 
 • the FSA will consider the appropriate FSCS coverage for client accounts and 
similar arrangements; and 
 • the FSA to explore with the financial sector ways for customers to cover amounts 
above the compensation limits. 
2. In relation to faster compensation payment: 
 • the Government proposes legislation to enable the FSA to collect the information 
the FSCS requires, and share it with the FSCS at the first sign of difficulties in a 
bank, and to enable the FSCS to obtain information from firms at the earlier of 
when a firm is declared in default or the date a claim is made; 
 • the FSA intends to consult on new rules to simplify the eligibility criteria for FSCS 
payments; 
 • the FSA intends to consult on a move to gross payments and for compatible 
provisions on set-off to be included in the new bank insolvency procedure; 
 • the Government proposes legislation and the FSA intends to consult on new rules 
to remove the need for consumers to make formal claims for compensation and to 
remove the need for claimants to make a formal assignment of their rights to the 
FSCS in all cases when they receive compensation; 
 • the Government is seeking views on ways to ensure that the FSCS has access to 
immediate liquidity, including pre-funding; and 
 • the Authorities to work with banks and appropriate trade bodies to ensure that 
consumers can open a new account quickly enough to facilitate FSCS payments. 
3. In relation to consumer awareness, the FSA intends to consult on how consumers can 
be better informed about the FSCS. 
4. In relation to other protection for consumers: 
 • the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) will introduce contingency plans to ensure that consumers can receive 
benefits and tax credits in the event of bank failure; and 
 • the Government proposes legislation to strengthen the arrangements underpinning 
bank banknote issuance by commercial banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland and 
to bring the law in Scotland relating to the treatment of cheques into line with that 
in the rest of the UK. 
5. In relation to other changes to compensation arrangements: 
 • the Government proposes legislation to ensure that the FSCS has the management 
flexibility it needs to manage a wide range of claim volumes; and 
 • the FSA is seeking views on the advantages and disadvantages of introducing risk-
based levies or other ways of bringing behavioural factors into levy calculations. 
 
To Strengthen the Bank of England and Improve Co-ordination between the 
Relevant Authorities 
 
Under this final heading, the authorities analyse the workings of the current Tripartite 
arrangements and cross-border co-operation. Whilst concurring with the Treasury 
Committee's view that the former set of arrangements are appropriate for the UK they, 
nevertheless, argue that they could be improved through, for example, providing a 
statutory basis for the Bank of England's financial stability role and improving governance 
arrangements within the Bank to support the new statutory obligations. Moreover, they go 
on to argue for a strengthening of the Memorandum of Understanding, applying lessons 
from the application of COBR during 'crisis' situations, and for improvements in external 
communications. And, with respect to cross-border co-operation, there is a perceived need 
to improve the co-ordination of approaches adopted towards international financial 
stability issues, to introduce an early warning scheme on global financial risks, and to 
improve cross-border crisis management. 
 
 Specifically, in relation to the objectives and governance of the Bank of England, the 
Authorities propose (Chapter 6, p.87): 
 • legislation to formalise the Bank of England's role in the area of financial stability 
and to give its Court a formal role in overseeing the Bank of England's 
performance in this area; 
 • to support the Bank of England's enhanced statutory role in financial stability, 
legislation to amend the provisions governing the size and composition of the 
Court; and 
 • that the Bank of England modernises the arrangements for meetings of the Court. 
And, with respect to the desire to improve co-ordination between the Authorities, the 
following proposals were made (Chapter 7, pp.97-98): 
1. In relation to the Tripartite arrangements: 
 • the Authorities intend to apply some of the lessons from the operation of COBR to 
the working of the tripartite arrangements: 
 • the FSA and the Bank of England will consider the scope for greater combined 
initiatives to develop common understanding; and 
 • the Authorities propose to clarify responsibilities within the Memorandum of 
Understanding for decisions around providing support to firms – in particular, 
emergency liquidity assistance. 
2. In relation to international co-ordination: 
 • the Authorities will work with international counterparts to pursue changes to 
improve the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF); 
 • the Authorities propose that the IMF considers how to improve further the focus of 
its financial sector surveillance; 
 • the Authorities propose that the FSF and IMF enhance their co-operation to bring 
together the intelligence gathered from IMF surveillance and from FSF members; 
and 
 • the Authorities will continue to work with international counterparts to improve 
international crisis management arrangements and ensure the UK authorities are 
well prepared to respond to international financial crises, building on on-going 
initiatives in the EU and FSF, and working bilaterally with key partners who share 
exposures to specific risks. 
 
An Assessment 
Whilst I have no quarrel with the eminently sensible set of proposals set out to deliver the 
first two key objectives, once again, I disagree with the suggested structural solution to the 
problems posed by the introduction of a 'special resolution regime' under attempts to 
reduce the impact of bank failure. The Authorities favour the FSA triggering activation of 
the new regime following consultation with HM Treasury and the Bank, although they are 
still consulting on which body should oversee the scheme's operation once triggered – the 
Treasury, the Bank, the FSA or the FSCS. Moreover, the Authorities argue credit unions 
should not be subject to the new regime. My own view, as outlined earlier, is that a new 
Deposit Protection Agency should be established to conduct both insurance operations (all 
deposits other than, maybe, those of credit union customers should be protected) and to 
implement the new failure resolution measures. In this way, monetary policy (the primary 
function of the Bank, although it cannot avoid some responsibility for financial stability 
given its control of the money supply and its lender of last resort responsibilities) would 
be separated from supervision (the preserve of the FSA, with added responsibilities under 
a PCA-type regime – which the Authorities do not explicitly mention, unlike the Treasury 
Committee) which, in turn, would be separated from the deposit insurance and failure 
resolution functions. 
  
 With respect to the Authorities' proposals for depositor protection arrangements, much 
remains to be confirmed. The Authorities are firmly of the opinion that the maximum 
period for compensation should be reduced to seven days from the date of a bank failing 
(this would still be well in excess of the one day norm in the US, however), that co-
insurance for depositors should not be re-introduced and that the deposit protection body's 
resources should be augmented by an element of pre- (i.e. ex-ante) funding and, in the 
event of a crisis, through access to Government/Bank of England funding (necessary to 
enhance the credibility of the scheme given its limited resources). The FSA, however, will 
continue to consult on whether or not there is a need to increase the compensation limit 
beyond £35,000 (to increase the value rather than number of deposits covered), on a 
possible extension of coverage (e.g. to corporate customers, collective investment 
schemes, governmental bodies and pension and retirement funds), on the merits of 
switching from a net (where customers must net off outstanding debts against their 
deposits to determine the size of their claims) to a gross payments basis, and on the best 
ways to enhance customer awareness of the existence and nature of the scheme. 
 
 Whilst I have no disagreement with the decisions already announced, I again return to 
the optional structural arrangements necessary to allow for the delivery of a cost-
effectiveness deposit protection framework. I simply reiterate my preference here for the 
establishment of a new deposit protection agency to cover the deposits held in all deposit-
taking institutions other than, maybe, credit unions (where the current deposit sub-scheme 
of the FSCS would apply). As recommended, the FSA would then have to collect and 
share with this body the information necessary to allow the latter to carry out its allotted 
tasks. 
 
 Finally, in connection with the Authorities' desires to strengthen the Bank of England 
and improve co-ordination between the Authorities themselves and with their overseas 
counterparts, there is little which is contentious. The proposed legislation to formalise the 
Bank's role in the area of financial stability and to give its Court a formal role in 
overseeing the Bank's performance in this area, for example, seem eminently sensible, as 
are the proposed changes to the size and composition of the Court and to the arrangements 
governing the Court's meetings. Similarly, the determination to improve the workings of 
the Tripartite arrangements through measures designed to increase common understanding 
and to clarify responsibilities under the Memorandum of Understanding for decisions 
surrounding the provision of support to firms, particularly in the form of emergency 
liquidity assistance, are to be welcomed (although the benefit of importing insights from 
the operation of the UK's COBR remains to be seen). Indeed, the recommended changes 
imply a recognition that the Tripartite arrangements did not work particularly well in the 
case of Northern Rock, the strong belief of the Treasury Committee, but something denied 
by the Authorities in their testimony to the Committee yet reinforced by the recent spats 
over the filling of senior positions at the Bank and the precise role to be played by the 
Bank in reformed financial stability arrangements which betrayed a worrying degree of 
disharmony between the Bank and the Treasury. Such public disagreements do little to re-
assure nervous investors and nothing to enhance the credibility of the monetary authority. 
And finally, the measures aimed at increasing international co-operation in the area of 
financial economic stability, particularly with respect to cross-border crisis management, 
also deserve unequivocal support. 
WIDER REGULATORY ISSUES 
 
 
 
Apart from the parochial difficulties facing the UK authorities, there is a range of 
regulatory issues facing the wider international community [pre-March 2008 action is 
summarised in House of Commons, 2008b, Section 5]. The perennial problem surrounding 
the operations of rating agencies is again to the fore given the inherent conflicts of interest 
they face, e.g. they are paid by the issuers they rate rather than the investors they serve; 
and their consultancy fees can dwarf the ratings fees earnt. With respect to the sub-prime 
crisis, the rating agencies have been castigated for not foreseeing the problem early 
enough, for not reacting quickly enough once higher than expected defaults arose, for 
making errors in their computer models, and for being so closely involved with their 
investment banking clients in the structuring of complex, high-yielding securities [e.g. 
RMBSs and CDOs] so as to secure the 'Triple A' ratings which are required to attract 
investment from pension funds and others. Whilst the agencies argue that they are only 
giving an opinion on the likelihood of default and/or likely size of expected losses, and 
caution that further due diligence is necessary on behalf of investors before making 
decisions, they have, nevertheless, admitted that some of their "opinions" proved wide of 
the mark and that some computing errors were made [i.e. in respect of the rating of 
'constant proportion debt obligations' (CPDOs)]. Accordingly, most have moved to amend 
their ratings methodologies for sub-prime securities, and some (e.g. Moody's) are 
considering adding indications of "liquidity" and "market value" to their usual credit 
ratings. [Other suggested improvements are contained in Bank of England, 2007a, at p.57, 
and in House of Commons, 2008b, Section 7, pp.67-74.]xxvii 
 
 Despite these developments, some investors are keen to test their apparent immunity 
from prosecution in the law courts; and many bodies, including the SEC, IOSCO, the 
European Community, the US President's 'Working Group on Financial Markets' and the 
US Congress, are currently embroiled in debates about what can be done to improve 
matters. [In May 2008, IOSCO unveiled a revised 'code of conduct' for the rating agencies 
focussing on, inter alia, improving transparency and reducing potential conflicts of 
interest. In contrast, the EU Commission is seeking a tougher regulatory response – in the 
shape of a registration system and formal external oversight – whilst the SEC is seeking to 
reduce the extent to which ratings are "hard-wired" into regulatory rules and investment 
processes.] 
 
 The questioning of the roles and performance of the rating agencies conveniently leads 
into the second general area of concern, namely the possible need to modify the Basel II 
arrangements for bank capital adequacy assessment. Apart from formally embracing the 
agencies' ratings within the so-called "standardised" approach (op. cit., Hall, 2004), the 
banks' widespread use of off-balance-sheet vehicles, such as 'conduits' and 'structured 
investment vehicles' (SIVs),xxviii represents the latest form of "regulatory capital arbitrage" 
(Jones, 2000) undertaken by the industry. Whilst it is true that Basel II reduced the banks' 
incentive to engage in such activities via securitisation compared with Basel I, and that 
Basel II, unlike Basel I, does levy a capital charge against contingency risks (such as those 
arising from the provision of contingent liquidity lifelines to conduits), scope for 
regulatory capital arbitrage remains. Moreover, there may be a case for levying a capital 
charge against some off-balance-sheet activities even when legal opinion attests to the lack 
of a residual exposure, if only to tackle reputational risk. Finally, given the failure of the 
banks' models to predict the recent sub-prime losses – the seizing up of the wholesale 
markets signalling, once again, the problems in dealing with fat-tailed distributions – the 
Basel Committee needs to look afresh at the whole use of models for setting regulatory 
capital charges. [The case for additional disclosure requirements is made in Bank of 
England, 2007a, at p.61.]xxix 
 
 The use of off-balance-sheet vehicles to reduce tax is another issue that requires 
scrutiny, as well as the more obvious abuses that have become apparent concerning the use 
of securitisation to drive the banks' "originate and distribute" models. Whilst securitisation 
has long been regarded as a highly-useful form of financial innovation that increases 
economic efficiency, with benefits for borrower and lender alike (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 
1988), and spreads risk, thereby reducing banking fragility, only now are policymakers 
waking up the problems posed by lack of transparency and complexity. No one is sure 
where the risks reside and too many end investors fail to appreciate the true nature of the 
risks they run because of the complexity of the products involved. Belated recognition of 
these problems has created fear and investor panic, resulting in the implosion of wholesale 
markets and the spread of the very contagion the innovation was designed to avoid. 
Possible solutions being considered are measures to ensure that those (including banks) 
who securitise assets retain an incentive to monitor their subsequent performance, greater 
scrutiny of both regulated and unregulated entities which originate loans (brokers' main 
concern is to maximise fees not the welfare of the borrowers),xxx and plans to ensure 
greater transparency and standardisation in the industry. Pressure is increasing to force 
banks to reveal more about the conduits and other off-balance-sheet vehicles they have 
established, the performance of structured products, the composition of assets inside 
complex instruments and the prices at which the securities trade in private. Likewise, 
hedge funds have to accept responsibility for disclosing more about their activities and 
exposures and possibly endure restrictions on their activities as a quid pro quo for the de 
facto support they are likely to enjoy in the event of a crisis (as proved to be the case with 
Long-Term Capital Management in the US in 1998) as a result of their capacity to damage 
the banking and wider financial system. 
 
 In summary, the emerging consensus, as for example outlined in Bank of England 
(2007a, Section 4) and, more recently, in Bank of England (2008, pp.12-14) and IMF 
(2008),xxxi is that the world needs to do more to address the weak points in the global 
financial system so cruelly exposed by the fallout from the US sub-prime crisis. This 
requires, inter alia, measures to improve credit risk assessment, increase transparency, 
address weaknesses in banks' liquidity risk management practices and limitations in its 
regulation, improve stress testing and contingency planning within firms to guard against 
extreme and correlated stocks, and to improve financial crisis management arrangements. 
Beyond this, and equally importantly, measures need also to be taken to ensure 
compensation packages secure a closer alignment between the interests of managers/ 
brokers/traders on the one hand and those of shareholders/regulators/taxpayers on the 
other. With respect to bonuses, this will require design features seeking to address the 
predilection towards the creation of short-term gains and "tail" risks, suggesting the 
greater use of risk-related and deferred bonuses. And finally, the frequency and severity of 
financial crises might be reduced if "macro-prudential" policies focussed more on 
excessive credit growth and asset price inflation, as recently argued by the BIS (BIS, 
2008). 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Whilst the level of UK financial institutions' direct exposure to the US sub-prime market 
was fairly limited, the shockwaves eventually transmitted through the international 
financial market place soon revealed stresses and weaknesses in the UK's arrangements for 
handling financial/banking crises. The modus operandi of each of the main players 
involved – the Bank, the FSA and the Treasury – has been called into question, along with 
the mechanisms in place for protecting depositors and ensuring co-ordination and co-
operation between the parties involved in delivering financial stability. The nationwide run 
on Northern Rock served to highlight most of these deficiencies and the fragile nature of 
the UK banking system. The post-mortems into the affair, not least that conducted by the 
House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee, have served to focus minds on how best 
to deal with the evident shortcomings, and the authorities themselves have duly responded 
with proposals for reform; but a wider debate needs to be held into the best way to 
proceed. No less than the reputation of the UK financial system and its integral 
components is at stake, a highly disconcerting fact given the enormous contribution it 
makes to the health of the UK economy. The analysis and recommendations contained in 
this article are offered up as a contribution towards and stimulant of this wider debate 
which is urgently needed given the continuing threats faced by the domestic and 
international financial system.xxxii For, although the cumulative action of central banks 
around the world may well have eased liquidity conditionsxxxiii - albeit at the expense of a 
weakening in their own balance sheets - and reduced systemic risks, and despite some 
market signalsxxxiv that the worst of the crisis may be behind us, there are sufficient 
groundsxxxv for believing that we are not out of the woods just yet!xxxvi 
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i
  The unfolding of these developments is well documented in Bank of England (2007a), at pp.6-9, and 
explored in more detail in Goodhart (2007a). 
ii
  This is reflected in the scale of UK bank writedowns on sub-prime-related business relative to those of 
their overseas counterparts. For example, Barclays' writedown of £1.3 billion (announced on 15 
November 2007), Alliance and Leicester's £55 million (announced on 29 November 2007 but followed, 
with an announcement made on 29 January 2008, by another £135 million writedown). Royal Bank of 
Scotland's £1.5 billion (announced on 6 December 2007) and Lloyds TSB's £200 million (announced on 
10 December 2007) contrast sharply with those made for the third quarter of 2007 by the likes of Merrill 
Lynch ($8 billion, followed by a fourth quarter writedown of $14.6 billion), Citigroup ($3.3 billion, 
followed by a further $18.1 billion in January 2008) and Morgan Stanley ($9.4 billion). And, elsewhere 
in Europe, UBS heads the list of sufferers with writedowns of $3.4 billion and $10 billion announced in 
November and December 2007 respectively, followed by a further $4 billion in January 2008 (full-year 
losses of $18.4 billion were subsequently revealed). Unsurprisingly, as at Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, 
the CEO at UBS was also forced out of office. 
   More recently, end-of-year reporting has revealed the full scale of related writedowns for 2007: 
Bradford and Bingley, £226 million; Barclays, £1.635 billion; Alliance and Leicester, £185 million; 
Lloyds TSB, £280 million; Standard and Chartered, $300 million; HBOS, £227 million; RBS, £2.9 
billion; and HSBC, $17.2 billion. [For 2008-related writedowns see Tables 1 and 2.] 
iii
  The solvency of individual institutions is also adversely affected by the conservative writedowns called 
for by auditors wary of litigation post-Enron, further deterioration in structured finance markets, 
accelerating credit downgrades of CDOs, SIVs and "monoline" guarantors and re-intermediation 
following the consolidation of SIV balance sheets. The last-mentioned refers to the action taken by banks 
(e.g. HSBC, $45 billion; Standard Chartered, $3 billion; Rabobank, €5.2 billion; Société Générale, €4.3 
billion; and Citigroup, $49 billion) to rescue their SIVs in this way in order to reduce reputational risk. 
The subsequent scramble for new equity has led a growing number of banks to tap sovereign wealth 
funds for the necessary finance. For example, UBS has raised SFr 13 billion from the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation and an un-named Middle Eastern investor; Citigroup has raised $7.5 
billion from the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, $9 billion from the China Investment Corporation, £4 
billion from the Kuwait Investment Authority and $6.86 billion from the Singapore Investment 
Corporation; Morgan Stanley has raised $5 billion from the China Investment Corporation; and Merrill 
Lynch has raised $4.4 billion from Temasek Holdings (the Singapore state investment company), $2 
billion from the Kuwait Investment Authority and $3.4 billion from the Korean Investment Corporation. 
iv
  No other UK mortgage provider came near to operating a 75 per cent / 25 per cent wholesale/retail 
funding mix, with the Alliance and Leicester and Bradford and Bingley, the next most heavily dependent 
on wholesale funding, running ratios of nearer 50 per cent / 50 per cent. Ironically, this didn't protect 
them from speculators on the hunt for further victims, causing extreme volatility in their respective share 
prices. 
v
  Its residential lending in the UK rose by 55 per cent in the first eight months of 2007 at a time of slowing 
house price rises. And its share of net new lending in the UK housing market rose to 19 per cent by mid-
2007. 
vi
  The world's banking system is estimated to have around $1.4 trillion of exposures to such conduits. Two 
of the worst affected – Germany's IKB and Sachsen LB – have already become casualties (see Table 1) 
as their conduits' funding dried up. 
vii
  Banks have been hit directly as a result of their own investments and indirectly because of failed 
syndications, the downward pressure on asset prices arising from investment vehicles' firesale of assets 
and exposure to the leveraged buyout industry.  
viii
  The preferred solution of all concerned is an outright sale, preferably to a larger bank. Despite its relative 
attractions – low cost operator, better than average quality loan book, continuing access (but at penal 
rates) to the Bank's liquidity lifeline for as long as EU rules allow – however, formidable problems 
remain for potential bidders. The business is currently running at a loss (i.e. the yield on the mortgage 
book is lower than the funding cost). The bank's franchise value has been greatly reduced by the 
reputational damage caused. The scale of the funding burden (the Bank, which has already lent over £25 
billion, would also have to be repaid) is enormous. And no one is sure how long the liquidity crunch will 
last for.  
   In the event, only two "approved" private sector bidders were left in the race following the withdrawal 
of the US private equity group J.C. Flowers and Co. on the 6 December 2007. This comprised the Virgin-
 
 led consortium, which had earlier acquired "preferred bidder" status, and the private equity firm, Olivant. 
The former group, which includes AIG and hopes to secure funding from Deutsche Bank, RBS and 
Citigroup amongst others, planned to take a majority stake (55 per cent) in the bank, which it would 
merge with Virgin Money, the latter name usurping the Northern Rock brand. The proposed takeover 
involved the injection of  £1.3 billion in cash, £650 million coming from a rights issue (which will secure 
45 per cent of the new company for existing shareholders) and £650 million from the consortium. Virgin 
Money, valued at around £250 million, would also be merged with the new entity. The consortium also 
planned to repay £11 billion of the Bank of England's loan immediately, with the rest being repaid by the 
end of 2010. It hoped to retain the Treasury's guarantee during this period, and would rank the Bank of 
England's claims equally with private sector creditors. 
   Olivant, however, was offering to install new management to manage the bank in return for a minority 
stake (15 per cent). Under the terms of its revised offer (revealed on 7 December 2007), it would repay 
between £10 billion and £15 billion of the Bank of England's loan immediately with the balance being 
repaid by end-2009. The provision of warrants would also give the Bank a 5 per cent  equity stake if 
Northern Rock's share price recovered sufficiently. A cash injection of £150 million was also promised 
with the expectation that existing shareholders would stump up between £450 million and £650 million 
collectively. It also expected to enjoy the Treasury's guarantee until the Bank is fully repaid. 
   In the face of doubts about either party's ability to raise the necessary funding – they also have to gain 
shareholders' approval – the Treasury secured the services of Ron Sadler to act as Executive Chairman in 
waiting in case the (temporary) nationalisation route was chosen by the Government. The necessary 
legislation was also prepared in case this was the outcome. In the event, however, the Government 
decided to try one last time to facilitate a private sector solution, duly backing Goldman Sachs' plan (see 
the entry for 21.1.08 on Table 2) to convert Northern Rock's loan from the Bank of England into 
government-guaranteed bonds, to be fed to the market as circumstances allow. Although avoiding the 
political embarrassment associated with nationalisation, the decision meant that UK taxpayers could be 
burdened with a £58 billion plus exposure to Northern Rock for the foreseeable future with no guarantee 
that all the funds would ever be repaid to the Bank, which remains heavily exposed, on our behalf, to a 
rapidly-deteriorating domestic mortgage market. 
   As it transpired, only two bids were received on 4 February – Olivant having dropped out – leaving the 
Government to decide between the bids submitted by the Virgin-led consortium and Northern Rock's 
existing management and the option of temporary nationalisation. The latter option was subsequently 
chosen in February 2008 as it was deemed to offer better value for money for the taxpayer, although 
shrinkage of the bank – a necessity if EU Commission rules on State-aid are to be satisfied – may 
jeopardise taxpayer returns, especially if its securitisation vehicle, Granite, is adversely affected. 
ix
  Ironically, some melted away faster than others, the laggards maybe doubting the word of ministers – not 
totally unsurprising given the previous Chancellor's well-documented raids on pension funds and the 
limited restitution on offer to policyholders in the aftermath of the collapse of Equitable Life – or 
otherwise questioning the credibility of such a mammoth undertaking. 
x
  Under the UK Financial Services Compensation Fund protection was previously limited to 100 per cent 
of the first £2,000 and 90 per cent of the next £33,000, on a per customer per bank basis. Maximum 
protection has thus been increased to £35,000 from £31,700, and "co-insurance" (see text) no longer 
applies. 
xi
  Notwithstanding the fact that both the Bank and the Treasury had prophesied just such an eventuality 
(i.e. of market liquidity squeezes and a tightening of lending terms) in their April 2007 'Financial 
Stability Report' (p.47) (Bank of England, 2007b) and January 'Financial Risk Outlook' (FSA, 2007a) 
respectively. 
xii
  Noyer (2007) notes that such action is justified as it represents accommodation of an exogenous increase 
in demand for Bank money, arising from the temporary financial turbulence and uncertainty, rather than 
a change in medium term oriented monetary policy. 
xiii
  As noted in Table 2, Barclays Bank twice accessed such funding in the Summer of 2007. Although 
borrowers in such situations are supposed to remain anonymous, its identity leaked out to the market 
causing Barclays furiously to deny that it was in need of an infusion of liquidity other than for technical 
reasons. Barclays' experience is likely to cause other banks to think twice before taking advantage of the 
facility, even if it were profitable to do so. 
xiv
  Moreover, Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland have since been granted (collateralised) access by 
the Fed to $20 billion and $10 billion of funding respectively under an emergency discount window 
facility designed to alleviate the problems of distressed US securities customers of the banks' US 
operations. 
 
 xv
  Although some argue a six month limit may be operable under EU law on state aid (the Treasury is 
looking towards a solution being reached by February 2008), a further six months of "restructuring" (as 
opposed to "rescue") aid may be possible. 
xvi
  The presumption is that a rate of at least 7 per cent is being charged as this would be in excess of the 
penalty rate (6.75 per cent) charged on drawings under the standing facility discussed earlier in the text. 
The size of 'haircuts' being applied to the non-standard collateral is unknown also. 
xvii
  To avoid such a situation recurring some suggest that the Governor should, in future, be restricted to 
serving one term of office. 
xviii
  Some dispute the advice (House of Commons, 2008a, pp.59-62, paras.129-137), whilst others rightly 
ask why it took a crisis for the hamstrung nature of the surrounding legal framework to be revealed. 
Couldn't this have been ascertained earlier? 
xix
  Some, as a result, wonder if there is something out there that the Bank has had forewarning of, but the 
market has not yet spotted. 
xx
  The allocation of respective responsibilities under the 'Memorandum of Understanding' was modified in 
March 2006, changing the Bank's remit to one of "contributing to the maintenance of stability of the 
financial system as a whole". 
xxi
  The Bank has since acknowledged that improvements in the tripartite arrangements are required along 
with the other components of the crisis management arrangements (i.e. bank insolvency arrangements 
and deposit insurance arrangements) (Bank of England, 2007a, p.2). And the need for a review was 
acknowledged by the Chancellor in his statement to the House of Commons on financial market 
instability on 11 October 2007. 
xxii
  Again, the Bank has since said that, although it does not believe it needs to take back responsibility for 
banking supervision, there may be a case for it to, once again, gather more information on individual 
banks. 
xxiii
  Apart from asking for adequate diversification of liquidity sources, supervisors have long applied either 
a high quality liquidity stock requirement, designed to allow large UK retail banks to survive without one 
week of wholesale funding, or maturity mismatch limits  (for all  other banks) (Hall, 1999, chapter 18). 
Clearly the former requirement, which was presumably applied to Northern Rock, would always have 
proved woefully inadequate in the event of a sustained seizure in the wholesale markets. [In its defence – 
see House of Commons, 2008a, p.15, para.22 – Northern Rock argued that it had sought to diversify 
funding sources both by product (i.e. retail deposits, covered bonds, securitisation and wholesale 
deposits) and geography.] 
xxiv
  The Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive was adopted by EU Member States in May 1994 for 
implementation by 1 July 1995. 
xxv
  The idea is that the mere provision of such arrangements helps obviate the need for their activation by 
reducing the incentive for individual depositors to precipitate or participate in a deposit run. If people 
don't know of its existence they can't possibly act in the presumed manner. 
xxvi
  The FSA's bout of "navel gazing", reminiscent of the Board of Banking Supervision's review of the Bank 
of England's supervision of Barings plc (see Hall, 1999, Chapter 12), makes for painful reading. The 
Internal Audit review identifies four key failings in the supervision of Northern Rock (FSA Press 
Release, 2008): 
 1. A lack of sufficient supervisory engagement with the firm, in particular the failure of the supervisory 
team to follow up rigorously with the management of the firm on the business model's vulnerability 
arising from changing market conditions. 
 2. A lack of adequate oversight and review by FSA line management of the quality, intensity and rigour 
of the firm's supervision. 
 3. Inadequate specific resource directly supervising the firm. 
 4. A lack of intensity by the FSA in ensuring that all available risk information was properly utilised to 
inform its supervisory actions. 
 The Review Team's 'Executive Summary' provides further detail on these failings, which meant the 
supervision of the bank, classified as a "high impact" firm under the FSA's own 'ARROW' risk 
framework, proved deficient. A theme running throughout the Review was the difficulties posed by high 
staff turnover which, for example, hindered effective engagement with the firm by Heads of Department, 
created shortages in expertise in crucial areas (e.g. prudential banking and financial data analysis) and 
militated against effective FSA management oversight. Moreover, given the bank was supervised for part 
of the time under review by a Department whose primary responsibility was for insurance groups, one 
has to question the level of expertise brought to bear against Northern Rock's operations. In terms of 
supervisory performance, a number of instances of "bad practice" were identified. For example, contrary 
 
 to ARROW standard practices, formal records of key meetings were not prepared. Moreover, although 
not formally required under ARROW I procedures, it would have been most useful if formal peer group 
financial analysis (e.g. on asset growth, profitability, net interest margins, cost to income ratios, reliance 
on wholesale funding and securitisation, etc.) had been presented by the supervisory team at ARROW 
Panel meetings. Instances of poor judgement are also paraded for our attention, not least the ARROW 
Panel's decision to endorse the supervisory team's proposal not to issue a 'Risk Mitigation Programme', a 
mechanism, shared with the firm, designed to highlight, pursue and track contentious issues using a 
common framework. [Northern Rock was the only high impact firm not to have one.] Similarly, it is 
difficult to comprehend, even if one accepts that some of the bank's most acute risks were "low-
probability" events, the ARROW Panel's decision to lengthen the period between formal ARROW risk 
assessments of Northern Rock to 36 months, the maximum allowed under internal procedures and 12 
months longer than that proposed by the supervisory team. This meant that interim supervision, post 20 
February 2006, would be carried out under the less rigorous arrangements for "Close and Continuous" 
supervision. In the event, only seven such meetings were ever held, five of which were held on one day 
(30 April 2007), a typed record of which was not even produced! Moreover, supervisors did not appear 
to fully understand their responsibilities under this framework. 
   These observations duly led the Review Team to conclude that "overall, the supervision of Northern 
Rock was at the extreme end of the spectrum within the firms reviewed in respect of these failings and 
that its supervision did not reflect the general practice of supervision of high-impact firms at the FSA". In 
other words, people rather than systems/procedures, were primarily to blame. Nevertheless, with an eye 
on the future, the Review Team makes seven high level recommendations (for further details see 
Appendix 2 of the FSA's document entitled 'Recommendations and Actions'): 
 • FSA senior management to have increased engagement with high-impact firms (to include an annual 
review of the firm's business/strategic plans); 
 • FSA to increase the rigour of its day-to-day supervision; 
 • FSA to increase its focus on prudential supervision, including liquidity and stress testing; 
 • FSA to improve its use of information and intelligence in its supervision; 
 • FSA to improve the quality and resourcing of its financial and sectoral analysis; 
 • FSA to strengthen supervisory resources; and 
 • FSA senior management to increase the level of oversight of firms' supervision. 
   In response to the Internal Audit Report and to the earlier (January 2008) Tripartite Authorities' 
proposals for enhancing the general framework for dealing with a bank failure, the FSA duly proposed a 
'Supervisory Enhancement Programme' designed to strengthen its overall supervisory process. The 
programme will also incorporate the improvements already under way, as agreed in 2007, and will be a 
key component of the current three-year plan (running from 2007 to 2010) which, in terms of internal 
change, has as its primary objective the creation of an effective management, operational and cultural 
framework to deliver more principles-based regulation. The main features of the programme, which is 
due to be completed by December 2008, are (FSA Press Release, 2008): 
 • A new group of supervisory specialists will regularly review the supervision of all high-impact firms to 
ensure procedures are being rigorously adhered to. 
 • The number of supervisory staff engaged with high-impact firms will be increased, with a mandated 
minimum level of staffing for each firm. 
 • The existing specialist prudential risk department of the FSA will be expanded following its upgrading 
to divisional status, as will the resource of the relevant sector teams. 
 • The current supervisory training and competence framework for FSA staff will be upgraded. 
 • The degree of FSA senior management involvement in direct supervision and contact with high-impact 
firms will be increased. 
 • There will be more focus on liquidity, particularly in the supervision of high-impact retail firms. 
 • There will be raised emphasis on assessing the competence of firms' senior management. 
xxvii
  The first rating agency to respond to the calls for reform was Standard & Poor's, which revealed a set of 
reform proposals on 7 February 2008. The proposed reforms aim to tackle concerns about conflicts of 
interest (e.g. through the enforced rotation of analysts and monitoring of the track record of analysts who 
leave to work for issuers), the accuracy of ratings (through increased historic review), the remit of its 
analysis (trading liquidity and securities valuation may accompany the traditional default risk analysis), 
the transparency of ratings ("identifier" marks may be used to flag up new complex securitisation 
processes, for example, and scenario analysis is likely to be more widely used) and investor ignorance (to 
be dealt with through enhanced investor education). 
 
 xxviii
  The conduits fund themselves largely by issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and invest in 
highly-rated, but high yielding assets, such as CDOs. Once investors were spooked by the valuation of  
CDOs, the ABCP market went into freefall. SIVs are very similar but are more highly geared. They 
typically lack the back-up lines of liquidity enjoyed by conduits, and invest more heavily in RMBS. 
Hence the need for a "super-fund" – see Table 1, entry for the 15 October – if firesale assets are to be 
avoided, although the plan has since been criticised for not clarifying the prices at which assets will be 
sold to the fund. The fear is that above-market prices will be paid, thereby letting SIV managers off the 
hook.  
xxix
  The Basel Committee has recently (Basel Committee, 2008a) announced plans to strengthen the 
resilience of the international banking system in the light of the fallout from the sub-prime crisis. It plans 
to do this by boosting capital cushions, creating robust liquidity buffers, strengthening risk management 
and supervision, and enhancing market discipline through increased transparency. 
   With respect to capital cushions, the Committee plans to increase capital requirements for certain 
complex structured credit products (such as the so-called "re-securitisations" or CDOs of ABS), 
especially those held in the trading book, and strengthen the capital treatment of liquidity facilities 
extended to support OBS vehicles such as ABCP conduits. A further quantitative impact assessment of 
its new proposals is planned, and the Committee will also monitor capital buffers over the credit cycle. 
   In respect of liquidity buffers, the Committee published, in June 2008 (Basel Committee, 2008b), a 
consultation paper on global sound practice standards for the management and supervision of liquidity 
risks. This paper addresses, inter alia, stress testing practices and the management of on- and off-balance 
sheet activity. The Committee will also review the need for more consistency in global liquidity 
regulation and supervision of cross-border banks. 
   As regards risk management and supervision, the Committee will issue Pillar 2 guidance on the 
management of firm-wide risks, stress-testing practices and capital planning processes, the management 
of OBS exposures and associated reputational risks, risk management practices relating to securitisation 
activities, and the supervisory assessment of banks' valuation practices. 
   Finally, with respect to transparency, the Committee is determined to promote stronger industry 
practices in the areas of disclosure and valuation. On the former front, the Committee is seeking 
enhanced disclosures relating to complex securitisation exposures, ABCP conduits and the sponsorship 
of OBS vehicles. Further Pillar 3 guidance in this area is promised by 2009. And, on the latter front, the 
Committee will develop guidance that supervisors can use to assess the rigour of banks' valuation 
processes, thereby promoting improvements in risk management in this area. 
   A further consultation paper (Basel Committee, 2008c) was issued in July 2008 setting out the 
Committee's proposals for revising the market-risk framework of Basel II. It seeks to apply capital 
charges to a wider range of investments held in the trading book, improve internal value-at-risk models 
used to measure market risk and update the prudent valuation guidance for positions (especially illiquid) 
subject to market risk. 
xxx
  As part of the Fed's reform of mortgage regulation in the US – see entry for 18.1.2007 in Table 1 – some 
abusive practices are banned, including the offering of "no-documentation" loans and the extension of 
loans made without regard being paid to a borrower's ability to repay. 
xxxi
  Both the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), representing major national supervisory authorities and central 
banks, and the Institute of International Finance (IIF), representing large banks primarily, also released 
reports in April 2008 outlining their proposals for reform. The former set of recommendations are set 
out, in detail, in Table 3. By way of contrast, the IIF opts for a set of "best-practice" recommendations, 
rather than a regulatory response, as the most appropriate way to prevent a recurrence of the turmoil and 
to strengthen the overall framework for sound risk management. The IIF intends monitoring industry 
compliance with the recommendations within the context of a voluntary "code of conduct". The 
recommendations, which will be confirmed in a final report to be released in the Summer of 2008, will 
cover the areas of risk management (including issues concerning risk culture, governance and stress 
testing), incentives (particularly the structure of compensation packages), conduits and liquidity risk, 
valuation, credit underwriting standards, the ratings process, and transparency and disclosure. 
xxxii
  The Bank (Bank of England, 2007a) has highlighted, in particular, the threats posed to the equity (this 
came to fruition with a global stock market crash on 21 January 2008 and renewed weakness in mid-July 
2008) and commercial property markets and by a continued weakening in the external value of the US 
dollar, as well as the continuing threats posed to credit markets. Despite the sub-prime-related losses 
already revealed – see footnote 2 – analysts believe further writedowns of up to $70 billion will be made 
by US banks before the crisis is over, with the G7 forecasting total global sub-prime-related losses may 
exceed $400 billion and the IMF trumping this with a 'guessestimate' of nearly $1 trillion. Moreover, 
 
 three month interbank rates, despite some easing, remain stubbornly high compared to policy Rates 
(necessitating a second round of co-ordinated central bank intervention in March 2008 – see Table 1), the 
ABCP  market, having contracted for 20 successive weeks in the period to end-December 2007, is still 
moribund and further contagion is threatened via the downgrading of the so-called "monolines" (i.e. 
specialist bond guarantors which currently guarantee £1.2 trillion of debt) in June 2008, trouble in the 
LBO and credit default swaps markets arising from increasing corporate defaults, rising consumer 
defaults on credit cards and car loans as the recession/downturn in economies begin to bite, and troubled 
funds (e.g. Peloton, Carlyle Capital Corps) dumping securities at firesale prices in a desperate bid to 
salvage something from the wreckage. Indeed, some of these problems have already led the fifth-largest 
investment bank in the US, Bear Stearns, to seek emergency liquidity support from the US Fed and to the 
FDIC taking over the running of IndyMac (see Table 1) and further rescues of US financial institutions 
cannot be ruled out – shares in Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae plunged in mid-July 2008 due to fears about 
their solvency prior to the authorities announcement of support. And, in the US, around 2 million homes 
are expected to be subject to foreclosure by end-2008, whilst mortgage providers in the UK tighten their 
lending criteria and scale back operations in the face of waning confidence, falling/stagnating property 
prices and rising re-possessions. They also anticipate a £30 billion funding shortfall in 2008 if the 
securitisation market does not recover.  
xxxiii
  Although differentials between three-month LIBOR rates and policy rates remain uncomfortably high as 
concerns about counterparty risk give way to "hoarding", in part a response to continuing fears that 
accessing special central bank lending facilities will tarnish one's reputation in the market place. 
Hoarding by US banks, in particular, has placed additional strains on European banks now starved of 
dollar-denominated interbank funds which their US counterparts, until recently, had been willing to 
provide (funded, in turn, by US money market funds). 
xxxiv
  For example, by mid-May 2008, bank share prices were generally recovering (in recognition of the fact 
that most – perhaps 80 per cent or so, as argued by Fitch Ratings – of the losses on sub-prime-related 
assets had been written off with writedowns probably overdone, and in light of the re-capitalisation of the 
banking system), investors were cautiously returning to the mortgage-backed bond and distressed 
mortgage assets markets, and the costs of protecting against financial institution defaults in the derivative 
markets were falling sharply. 
xxxv
  Residual fears relate to the continuing fragility of investor confidence, the slowdown in major 
economies (e.g. UK/US), which central banks are increasingly hamstrung from tackling because of the 
resurgence in inflation and which promises to raise bank losses on consumer and corporate lending at a 
time when credit conditions are already tightening, and further deterioration in housing conditions. The 
record fall in house prices in the US in the first quarter of 2008 (by over 14 per cent compared with a 
year earlier according to the S&P/Case–Shiller Index) foreshadows further sub-prime losses and rising 
re-possessions, a situation matched in the UK housing market which continues to dog the prospects of 
UK mortgage providers, most notably Bradford and Bingley. 
xxxvi
  The half-year results for UK banks revealed in August 2008 portray a sorry picture of UK banking. 
Alliance and Leicester reported a collapse in profits to just £2 million, a few days after selling out to 
Santander Bank at a knock-down price. Lloyds TSB and HBOS both reported 70 per cent plus falls in 
pre-tax profits whilst RBS reported a half-year loss of £691 million after making a sub-prime related 
writedown of £5.9 billion. Meanwhile, Bradford and Bingley was subject to an FSA-orchestrated rescue 
and recapitalisation after experiencing (along with HBOS) a failed rights issue. Finally, Northern Rock 
revealed a first-half loss of £585 million, threatening the taxpayers' investment in the bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 1.  THE US SUB-PRIME CRISIS AND NON-UK SPILLOVER EFFECTS: 
   CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
 
 
 
30.7.07 Germany's  IKB Deutsche Industriebank's off-balance-sheet vehicle 
Rhineland Funding is thrown a €8.1 billion liquidity lifeline by KfW, the 
state-owned bank that owns a 37.8% stake in IKB. Separately, KfW and a 
group of public and private German banks put together a €3.5 billion rescue 
fund to cover possible losses on IKB's own balance sheet. 
 
9.8.07  The European Central Bank injects €94.8 billion into the money markets, in a 
'front-loading' operation, to shore up confidence in the financial system. 49 
banks availed themselves of the funding. 
 
10.8.07 Central banks in Europe, N. America and Asia make emergency injections of 
liquidity, the ECB injecting another €61 billion. 
 
13.8.07 Goldman Sachs injects $2 billion to bail out its Global Equity Opportunities 
hedge fund. A further $1 billion is raised from outside investors to support 
the fund. Action follows Bear Stearns' earlier $1.6 billion loan to its 
struggling credit fund. 
 
17.8.07 Sachsen LB, a publicly-owned Landesbank, becomes the second German 
financial institution to be rescued via a €17. 3 billion credit facility from 
fellow savings banks. 
 
17.8.07 US Fed announces a new emergency credit facility providing term loans for 
up to 30 days. Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Wachovia 
each borrow $500 million, funds which will be passed on to clients, in a 
largely symbolic gesture as each claims to have ample liquidity and access to 
funds elsewhere in the system on better terms. 
 
22.8.07 ECB injects a further €40 billion into the three-month money market to 
reduce differentials vis-à-vis overnight rates. 
 
24.8.07  US Fed announces a 50 basis point cut in its discount rate and widens the 
range of securities it is willing to accept as eligible collateral (e.g. to include 
ABCP). 
 
6.9.07  ECB injects a further €42.2 billion to bring down overnight interest rates 
whilst US Fed injects a further $31.25 billion into overnight markets, its 
biggest intervention since 10 August. 
 
12.9.07 ECB injects a further  unscheduled €75 billion into the three-month money 
market (140 banks had, in fact, applied for €139 billion and agreed to pay a 
rate of 4.52 per cent, below interbank rates but above the ECB's target rate of 
4 per cent). 
 
 18.9.07 US Fed cuts the Federal funds rate by 50 basis points, to 4.75 per cent, as well 
as the discount rate by 50 basis points. Moves designed to 'help forestall 
some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise 
arise from the disruptions in financial markets'. 
 
15.10.07 Three large US banks (i.e. Citigroup, JP Morgan and Bank of America) 
announce a Treasury-backed plan to create a temporary $75 billion plus 
"super fund" to buy assets from the banks' structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs) in order to free up the commercial paper market. Sub-prime asset 
purchases are excluded from consideration. 
 
31.10.07 US Fed cuts the Federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.5 per cent. 
 
1.11.07 US Fed injects $41 billion to try to narrow the gap between money market 
rates and the new Federal funds rate. This is the largest one-day cash infusion 
since September 2001. 
 
8.11.07 ECB announces fresh measures to calm the markets. Will inject €60 billion of 
money into the market this month with a further €60 billion to be injected in 
December. 
 
23.11.07 ECB announces it will inject an unspecified amount of extra liquidity into the 
money market next week and will continue to do so at least until the end of 
2007 in order to deal with "re-emerging tensions". 
 
25.11.07 California's Governor announces a deal with four of the state's biggest 
mortgage lenders to slow the rate of home loan defaults. 
 
26.11.07 US Fed announces a new plan to avert an end-of-year funding crisis in the US 
money markets. A series of long-term liquidity operations spanning the New 
Year were revealed, starting with a $8 billion repo deal to mature on 10 
January 2008. The Fed also announced a relaxation of the terms on which 
market participants can borrow Treasury securities from its own portfolio. 
 
29.11.07 The banks which rescued IKB (see the entry above for 30.7.07) promise to 
cover a further $520 million of possible losses to prevent a collapse of the 
bank. 
 
31.11.07 ECB announces it will, exceptionally, extend a regular money market 
operation by an extra one week to cover the year-end period in order to keep 
market interest rates in line with its policy rate. 
 
6.12.07 US President unveils a voluntary plan to freeze interest rates on some sub-
prime loans for up to five years to limit foreclosures (some 300,000 
borrowers are expected to benefit). 
 
 
 11.12.07 US Fed cuts the Federal Funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.25 per cent and 
also the discount rate by 25 basis points to 4.75 per cent. 
 
12.12.07 Central banks around the World (i.e. the US Fed, the Bank of England, the 
ECB, the Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank) announced joint 
plans to make term funds (the total will not change, only the maturity mix) 
more readily available to banks. The Fed will create a new liquidity facility 
involving the auctioning of term loans to banks and the acceptance of a wider 
range of collateral, including housing-related securities. Two auctions, of $20 
billion each, of one-month loans will be held in December 2007, with a 
further two to be held in January 2008. The funds will go to the highest 
bidder and no minimum interest rate will apply. 
     The ECB and the Swiss National Bank, in turn, will enter into swap 
arrangements with the Fed to allow for the auction of $24 billion ($20 billion 
and $4 billion respectively) of dollar-denominated funds to European banks. 
 
17.12.07 ECB announces it will offer unlimited funds, for a period of two weeks, at 
below market interest rates to head off a year-end liquidity crisis and keep 
market rates close to its policy rate (4 per cent). 
 
18.12.07 ECB pumps a record €348.6 billion of two-week money into the markets. 
Some 390 Eurozone banks request funds, which are provided at 4.21 per 
cent. 
 
18.12.07 US Fed announces tough new rules on mortgage selling in the US. 
 
19.12.07 US Fed announces that 93 banks took part in this week's auction of one-
month money with the interest rate being set at 4.65 per cent (compared with 
a discount rate of 4.75 per cent). The banks bid for a total of $61.6 billion. 
 
19.12.07 ECB announces that it has auctioned $10 billion in one-month money to 39 
Eurozone banks under its new swap arrangement with the Fed, at a rate of 
interest of 4.65 per cent. 
     Separately, it also reveals that the demand for three-month euro loans fell 
below the €50 billion it was prepared to allocate; and that it had been forced 
to mop up €133.6 billion of excess overnight liquidity following its record 
injection of 18.12.07. 
 
21.12.07 US Fed and the ECB announce that they have jointly lent a total of $30 billion 
in 35-day funds over a 48-hour period. Of this amount, the ECB allotted $10 
billion in funds to Eurozone banks under its second dollar tender, with 27 
banks duly bidding for $14.1 billion. The Fed, in turn, in the second of its 
four special auctions, lent another $20 billion of one-month money at 4.67 
per cent, 73 banks bidding for a total of $55.7 billion of funds. In both cases, 
the auction served to reduce LIBOR spreads over official target rates. 
     Separately, the ECB also confirmed that further "mopping up" operations 
had led to it re-absorbing some €141.6 billion of funds from Eurozone banks 
 
 at a rate of interest of 4 per cent, thereby securing a tidy profit on its 
operations of the 18.12.07. 
 
21.12.07 Plans to create a $75 billion "super fund" (see entry above for 15.10.07) are 
abandoned due to lack of support from the banking industry, many banks 
preferring to consolidate their SIVs on to their own balance sheets. 
 
11.1.08 Bank of America agrees to buy the troubled (and largest) US mortgage lender 
Countrywide Financial for just under $4 billion. 
 
18.1.08 The monoline, Ambac, suffers a ratings downgrade, triggering downgrades 
for the bonds it guarantees, thereby threatening huge losses for the companies 
holding the bonds. The downgrading follows the downgrading of the smaller 
monoline, ACA Financial Guaranty, in December 2007. 
 
22.1.08 US Fed cuts the Federal funds rate by an unprecedented 75 basis points to 3.5 
per cent at an unscheduled meeting in a bid to ward off recession in the US. 
 
22.1.08 Ambac Financial, the World's second largest bond insurer, reports a $3.26 
billion loss after writing down the value of its guarantees on sub-prime 
mortgage-related bonds by $5.21 billion. 
 
22.1.08 Bank of America announces fourth quarter trading account losses of $5.44 
billion, mainly as a result of reductions in the value of CDOs. 
 
30.1.08 US Fed announces a further 50 basis points cut in the Federal funds rate, 
taking it to 3 per cent, in a further attempt to ward off recession in the US. 
The discount rate is also cut by 50 basis points. 
 
10.2.08 G7 finance ministers forecast global sub-prime-related losses could reach 
$400 billion, far in excess of the $100 billion - $150 billion forecast made by 
the US Fed in 2007. 
 
11.2.08 AIG, the US insurance company, raises its estimate of 2007 losses incurred on 
insuring mortgage-related instruments (e.g. CDOs) from $1 billion to $5 
billion. 
 
13.2.08 German government announces that it will lead a third bail-out of IKB. The 
Government will contribute up to €500 million. 
 
13.2.08 US President enacts a $170 billion fiscal stimulus package in an attempt to re-
invigorate the US economy. 
 
19.2.08 Credit Suisse announces $2.85 billion of losses on structured credit products 
that will reduce first quarter net income in 2008 by around $1 billion. 
 
6.3.08  ECB holds its policy rate at 4 per cent at its latest meeting. 
 
 
 7.3.08  US Fed announces it will increase its emergency liquidity assistance to $200 
billion via a $40 billion (taking the total to $100 billion) increase in the size 
of its auction of one-month's money and the creation of a new $100 billion 
one-month repo facility (aimed primarily at investment banks). The increase 
in funds made available through the extended term auction facility ("TAF") 
and new repo facility will be offset by reduced holdings of Treasury Bills by 
the Fed, thereby neutralising the overall impact on bank reserves. 
 
7.3.08  Carlyle Group reveals that Carlyle Capital Corp failed to meet a number of 
margin calls in the past week, triggering liquidation of its portfolio of RMBs 
and the suspension of the Amsterdam-listed fund's shares on the bourse. 
 
11.3.08 A second round of co-ordinated central bank intervention is announced. US 
Fed is to lend, via an auction, primary bond dealers up to $200 billion in 
Treasury securities for a month at a time in exchange for triple-A rated 
mortgage-backed securities as collateral. The Fed, the ECB and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) also announced an increase in the size of currency 
swaps (extended until September 2008) put in place in December 2007 by 50 
per cent. The two European central banks are to auction the dollars supplied 
by the Fed in the form of one-month loans, with the ECB initially offering 
$15 billion and the SNB $6 billion. And, finally, the Bank of Canada and the 
Bank of England – see Table 2 – also announced extensions in their liquidity 
support operations. 
 
14.3.08 US Fed provides $30 billion of emergency liquidity support, in the form of 
collateralised discount window lending, via JP Morgan Chase, to Bear 
Stearns, the fifth largest investment bank in the US. This is the first time cash 
has been disbursed to a US financial institution other than a regulated 
commercial bank since the 1930s, and reflected the Fed's concerns with the 
systemic risks associated with allowing the bank to fail given its 
interconnectedness with the wider US financial system via its operations in 
mortgage-backed securities and the credit default swaps and other derivatives 
markets, and its role as prime broker to hedge funds. 
 
16.3.08 US Fed sanctions a takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase – the latter 
offered $2 per share, payable in its own stock, to shareholders in the former, 
valuing Bear Stearns at a mere $230 million compared with a market 
capitalisation of around $20 billion just one year earlier – and extends 
discount window emergency support to all primary dealers, who can use 
investment grade securities as collateral to access the loans. 
 
18.3.08 US Fed cuts the Federal funds rate by a further 75 basis points, to 2.25 per 
cent, as well as the discount rate (by 75 basis points, taking it to 2.5 per cent). 
 
19.3.08 The US Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight announces a 
reduction in surplus regulatory capital requirements (from 30 per cent to 20) 
for the government-chartered mortgage providers Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to allow them to pump up to $200 billion of additional liquidity into the 
 
 beleaguered US mortgage market. In particular, the move was designed to 
allow the entities to support the market for "jumbo" mortgages (in excess of 
$417,000) and increase their capacity to refinance sub-prime home loans and 
conduct loan modifications for struggling borrowers. 
 
24.3.08 JP Morgan Chase raises its offer for Bear Stearns to $10 a share, valuing the 
latter at around $1.2 billion, and agrees to shoulder the first $1 billion of 
losses on the $30 billion of illiquid Bear assets the Fed agreed to fund under 
the assisted takeover. 
 
24.3.08 In a further bid to support the US housing market, the US Government, 
through the Federal Housing Finance Board, gives the Federal Home Loan 
Banks permission to increase (by over $100 billion) for two years their 
purchases of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the Government-chartered mortgage financiers. 
 
25.3.08 ECB allocates €216 billion - €50 billion more than normally required – in 
seven-day funds to the market in its normal weekly operation at an average 
interest rate of 4.28 per cent. And the US Fed, at its latest Term Auction 
Facility (TAF), receives bids for $88.9 billion compared with the $50 billion 
on offer. 
 
26.3.08 US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, calls on the Federal Reserve to 
formally supervise investment banks for as long as they enjoy access to 
discount window lending. 
 
27.3.08 Federal Reserve Bank of New York activates its 'Term Securities Lending 
Facility' (TSLF) auctioning $75 billion of US Treasury securities in exchange 
for other securities held by primary dealers. The loan lasts for 28 days. 
 
28.3.08 ECB announces its first injections of six-months money into Eurozone 
markets; €25 billion will be injected during the following week with another 
to follow in July 2008. These injections will complement additional 
injections of three-months money. 
 
28.3.08 Head of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
confirms that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had agreed to raise up to $10 
billion of new capital each in return for the earlier reductions made to their 
surplus regulatory capital requirements (from 30 per cent to 20 per cent). 
 
31.3.08 US Treasury unveils plans for a radical overhaul of financial regulation in the 
US. 
 
1.4.08  UBS announces a further $19 billion of sub-prime-related writedowns amid 
plans to park troubled sub-prime mortgage assets in a separate subsidiary. 
 
1.4.08  Deutsche Bank reveals first quarter writedowns of €2.5 billion, largely on its 
leveraged loan portfolio. 
 
  
2.4.08  Amid calls for tighter regulation, US GSEs (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and 
Federal Home Loan Banks) revealed to have taken a 90 per cent market share 
of new US mortgages by end-2007 as private sector suppliers withdraw from 
the market place. 
 
2.4.08  Eurozone banks bid for €103 billion of six-months money at the first €25 
billion auction of six-months money by the ECB, as three-month inter-bank 
interest rates (Euro Libor) rise to a 74 basis point premium over policy rates. 
 
3.4.08  Another of Germany's state Landesbanken, BayernLB, announces large 
writedowns on sub-prime-related securities, €2.3 billion to be made in the 
2007 accounts and a further €2 billion for the first quarter of 2008. 
 
4.4.08  EU finance ministers agree to co-operate more closely on cross-border 
supervision to help avert cross-border financial crises. The "accord" is due to 
come into force on 1 July 2008. 
 
8.4.08  IMF warns of potential credit crisis-related losses of nearly $1 trillion 
worldwide, split more or less equally between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, making it the most expensive financial crisis in history. 
 
9.4.08  The Institute of International Finance (IIF) releases its interim finance 
industry report, promising a code of conduct for better self-regulation of the 
finance industry amongst other proposals for reform. 
 
14.4.08 Wachovia, the fourth-largest US bank by assets size, announces a first quarter 
loss of $393 million after making a $2.8 billion provision for credit losses. 
 
14.4.08 The Financial Stability Forum presents a report to the G7 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors making recommendations for enhancing the 
resilience of markets and financial institutions. 
 
16.4.08 Basel Committee reveals plans to prevent a repetition of the credit crisis by, 
inter alia, requiring banks to hold more capital against exposures to OBS 
entities and holdings of complex debt securities. 
 
18.4.08 Citigroup announces a first quarter loss of $5.1 billion caused, in part, by 
nearly $16 billion of writedowns, including $6 billion on sub-prime 
mortgages, $3.1 billion on leveraged loans, $1.5 billion on exposure to 
monoline bond insurers and $1.5 billion on auction rate securities. 
 
30.4.08 US Fed cuts the Federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 2 per cent, taking the 
cumulative cut since mid-September 2007 to 325 basis points. 
 
2.5.08  US Fed increases the size of its credit auction facility, which provides one 
month loans to banks, from $100 billion to $150 billion. And, together with 
 
 the ECB and the SNB, it also announces a near 50 per cent increase in dollar 
currency swaps. 
 
6.5.08  The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight cuts Fannie Mae's 
surplus capital requirement again, from 20 per cent to 15 per cent. 
 
13.5.08 Chairman of the Federal Reserve announces that he is ready to increase the 
size of its credit auctions beyond the current level of $150 billion a month if 
stresses in the money markets warrant it. 
9.6.08  Lehman Brothers, the US investment bank, announces a second-quarter loss 
of $2.8 billion, largely due to losses on fixed income business. Plans to raise 
$6 billion through common and preferred stock issues were also announced 
simultaneously. 
 
17.6.08 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision releases a consultation paper on 
the 'Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision'. 
 
24.6.08 According to Standard & Poor's Case-Shiller Index, house prices in large US 
cities declined by a record 15.3 per cent in April 2008, dashing hopes of an 
early housing market recovery although the pace of house price decline 
across the country on a monthly basis eased from 2.2 per cent in March to 1.4 
per cent in April. 
 
3.7.08  The ECB raises its policy rate by 25 basis points to 4.25 per cent in the face 
of eurozone inflation of over 4 per cent, more than double its target of 2 per 
cent. 
 
8.7.08  US Fed announces that its emergency cash facility for investment banks will 
be extended beyond September 2008 if market turmoil persists. 
 
11.7.08 IndyMac Bancorp, a large Californian-based US regional bank, collapses and 
is subjected to a 'bridge bank' scheme by the FDIC. With assets of around 
$32 billion, this represents the US's second-biggest bank failure. Like 
Northern Rock in the UK, it also provided the spectre of queuing branch 
depositors. 
 
13.7.08 US Treasury announces that it will ask Congress for unlimited authority, until 
end-2009, to lend Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac money and invest in their 
equity. At the same time, the US Fed announces that it will provide the two 
GSEs with access to emergency cash on the same terms as banks, if 
necessary, pending Congress's approval of governmental support. The 
decisions are taken in the light of the two groups' near 50 per cent market 
share of the $12 trillion US home loans market and the increasing 
nervousness of their private investors. 
 
16.7.08 The CPI in the US is revealed to have grown by 5 per cent, at an annualised 
rate, in June 2008, the fastest rise since 1991. 
 
  
22.7.08 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reveals its proposed revisions to 
the Basel II market risk framework. 
 
29.7.08 Merrill Lynch announces sales of $30 billion of CDOs for $6.7 billion, 
raising just 22 cents on the dollar, intensifying pressure on other banks to 
make further writedowns on mortgage-related securities. 
 
29.7.08 Standard & Poor's Case-Shiller Index shows a record annualised 15.8 per 
cent fall in May 2008, dashing hopes of an early recovery in US house prices. 
 
30.7.08 US Fed announces that it will offer three-month cash loans to banks and 
create a new $50 billion options auction facility giving bidders the right to 
swap illiquid securities for Treasuries over periods of likely funding stress 
(e.g. year-end). Investment banks and other primary dealers will also be 
given extended access to emergency cash and loans of Treasury securities 
until 30 January 2009. 
    At the same time, it was also announced that the ECB and the SNB will 
offer three-month dollar loans through the off-shore dollar facility set up in 
conjunction with the Fed. The Fed will increase the amount of dollars it 
provides to the ECB in exchange for euros by $5 billion to $50 billion. 
 
30.7.08 Financial Accounting Standards Board votes to delay, until January 2010, the 
introduction of new rules forcing banks to consolidate more off-balance-sheet 
vehicles directly in their accounts. This means banks reporting under US 
GAAP rules may be able to delay consolidating up to $5 trillion of assets. 
 
6.8.08  Freddie Mac reveals a second-quarter loss of $821 million. 
 
8.8.08  Fannie Mae reveals a second-quarter loss of $2.3 billion. 
 
12.8.08 US and European banks bid heavily for dollar-denominated funds at the first 
auctions of three-month dollar funds under the 'TAF' scheme. European 
banks bid for almost four times the $10 billion available from the ECB, US 
banks bid for more than twice the $25 billion available at the Fed and Swiss 
banks bid for almost five times the funds available at the SNB. 
 
14.8.08 Publication of the latest inflation figures in the US reveals that the CPI stood 
at 5.6 per cent in July, the highest level for 17 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2.  US SUB-PRIME SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN THE UK: 
   CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
 
 
 
29.8.07 For the second time in just over a week (£314 million was borrowed on 20 
August) Barclays Bank is forced to use the Bank of England's standing 
facility, borrowing £1.6 billion overnight at a penalty rate. Reason proffered: 
a technical glitch on the payments system left the bank short of funds at the 
close of business. 
 
6.9.07  Bank of England holds the official base rate at 5.75 per cent taking the 
unprecedented step (it last happened eight years ago for a no-change 
decision) of issuing a public statement to explain their reasoning. 
 
12.9.07 In a letter to the House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee, Governor of 
the Bank of England sets out reasons why the Bank, unlike its counterpart in 
the US, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank is resisting 
pressure to provide liquidity against a wider range of collateral (i.e. other 
than government securities) and for longer periods of time (i.e. other than 
overnight). 
 
13.9.07 Bank of England makes available to UK banks an additional (relative to UK 
commercial banks' target reserve balances of £17.6 billion) £4.4 billion of 
penalty-free cash to narrow the gap between secured overnight rates and the 
official base rate (of 5.75 per cent). Offer fully taken up. Move not designed 
to narrow gap between three month rates and the official rate, however. 
 
14.9.07 Following assurances from the FSA that the bank is solvent, Bank of England 
provides emergency funding to Northern Rock, the UK's fifth largest 
mortgage lender and eighth largest bank, to allow it to continue operating (it 
is a casualty of the liquidity squeeze), to reassure the bank's depositors and to 
prevent a systemic crisis. Under the open-ended facility, the bank is charged 
a penal rate (not revealed to the market) and can use mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities as collateral. 
 
17.9.07 Treasury announces a full guarantee of Northern Rock's existing deposits in 
an attempt to stem the deposit run on the bank and restore financial 
confidence. Guarantee to last until the financial turmoil subsides and is later 
extended to all UK depositors. 
 
19.9.07 Bank of England announces that, contrary to its stated position of 12.9.07, it 
will now, after all, lend to banks for periods of up to three months against a 
wider range of collateral, including mortgages. An initial injection, via 
auction, of £10 billion is announced for the following week. Weekly auctions 
to follow. 
 
 
 20.9.07 Bank of England defends its policy volte face before the House of Commons' 
Treasury Select Committee. 
 
21.9.07 Confirmed that Northern Rock had borrowed around £3 billion from the Bank 
of England under the emergency funding facility put in place one week 
earlier. 
 
24.9.07 Northern Rock bows to political pressure and cancels its proposed £59 million 
dividend payout. 
 
26.9.07 Announced that the Bank had received no bids for funding at its £10 billion 
auction. 
 
27.9.07 Announced that Northern Rock's debt to the Bank of England is now £8 
billion. 
 
1.10.07 Chancellor announces that the level of depositor protection available under 
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is increased to 100 per cent of 
£35,000 (previously, it was 100 per cent of the first £2,000 plus 90 per cent 
of the next £33,000), on a per institution, per customer basis. 
 
2.10.07 Second weekly central bank offering of £10 billion is spurned by the banking 
industry. 
 
4.10.07 Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England decides to leave Base 
Rates unchanged at 5.75 per cent (unlike Fed's decision to cut rates by 50 
basis points to pre-empt a sharp downturn in the economy). 
 
4.10.07 Revealed that Northern Rock's indebtedness to the Bank of England now 
stands at around £11 billion. 
 
9.10.07 FSA officials appear before the House of Commons' Treasury Select 
Committee. They admit their monitoring of Northern Rock was "inadequate" 
in some respects. 
 
10.10.07 Once again, no bids were received for the third weekly auction of term loans 
by the Bank of England. 
 
11.10.07 Revealed that Northern Rock's indebtedness to the Bank of England now 
stands at around £13 billion, and that Northern Rock is now able to use any 
collateral to access the Bank's emergency lifeline although, presumably, this 
is reflected in the costs of the loan. 
 
11.10.07 Treasury publishes a discussion paper on possible changes to UK deposit 
protection arrangements. A follow-up consultation paper is promised early in 
2008, informed by the response to the discussion paper. 
 
 
 16.10.07 Northern Rock executives appear before the House of Commons' Treasury 
Select Committee. It is revealed that the Chairman and Chief Executive had 
twice offered to resign in the wake of the crisis; and that only £1.5 billion of 
liquidity insurance had been bought by the bank to cover possible funding 
difficulties in the wholesale markets. 
 
18.10.07 Revealed that Northern Rock's indebtedness to the Bank of England has risen 
to £16 billion. 
 
19.10.07 The Chairman of Northern Rock resigns.  
 
25.10.07 Treasury officials appear before the Treasury Select Committee. 
 
16.11.07 Chief Executive of Northern Rock, Adam Applegarth, resigns along with 
most of the Board. 
 
26.11.07 A consortium led by Sir Richard Branson's Virgin Group is named as the 
"preferred bidder" for Northern Rock by the Government and Northern 
Rock's Board. 
 
26.11.07 HSBC announced plans to take $45 billion of mainly complex debt 
instruments on to its balance sheet to rescue its SIVs. 
 
29.11.07 Bank of England announces it will provide £10 billion of liquidity until mid-
January to give banks greater certainty about their liquidity over the 
Christmas/New Year period. However, amount available in subsequent 
auctions to be reduced by this amount. In effect, the Bank is thus proposing 
to provide five weeks liquidity upfront rather than through weekly auctions. 
 
6.12.07 For the first time in two years the Bank of England cuts interest rates, by 25 
basis points to 5.5 per cent, as a result of a "tightening in the supply of credit 
to households and businesses". 
 
12.12.07 As part of a co-ordinated action by a number of central banks to forestall any 
prospective tightening of credit conditions, the Bank of England announces it 
will auction another £10 billion of three-month money the following week 
without a minimum interest rate applying and against a wider range of 
collateral (e.g. credit card-related securities, covered bonds and mortgage-
backed securities). A further £10 billion auction will follow on 15 January 
2008. 
 
14.12.07 Government hires Goldman Sachs, its advisers on the sale of Northern Rock, 
to help put together a re-financing package for Northern Rock in the face of 
funding difficulties being experienced by the two remaining "approved" 
private sector bidders – the Virgin-led consortium and Olivant. 
 
18.12.07 Bank of England announces that its latest auction of £10 billion of three-
month money was fully subscribed at an average interest rate of 5.95 per cent 
 
 (compared with a Base Rate of 5.5 per cent). The Bank also announces a 
wide-ranging review of its money market operations. 
 
19.12.07 FSA publishes a discussion paper on possible changes to the way banks' 
liquidity is regulated. 
 
10.1.08 FSA reveals a re-vamped operating model to deal with the post-Northern 
Rock era. 
 
11.1.08 Northern Rock sells £2.2 billion of (equity release) mortgage assets to JP 
Morgan. Funds to be used to reduce its debt (now standing at over £25 
billion) to the Bank of England. 
 
21.1.08 Government reveals the findings of the Goldman Sachs report commissioned 
on 14 December 2007. Given the inability of the two remaining "approved" 
private bidders for Northern Rock to find sufficient funding in the market 
place to allow them to deliver on their takeover proposals, the Government 
decides to back a Goldman Sachs plan which will see the conversion of 
Northern Rock's loan (now put at some £28 billion) from the Bank of 
England into government-guaranteed bonds which will be sold to private 
investors as market circumstances permit. Northern Rock will pay a fee to the 
Treasury for providing the guarantee, and will use mortgage redemption 
monies to pay the coupon and redemption payments due on the bonds. The 
Government has also demanded an equity stake so that taxpayers can 
participate in any revival in the bank's fortunes; and, for as long as the 
guarantee remains in place, it will impose restrictions on dividend payments 
and the sale of the bank. Bidders, including Northern Rock itself and 
"outsiders", are given until 4 February to submit their bids, indicating how 
they will satisfy the Government's requirements and the scale of the capital 
infusion they are envisaging. The Government hopes to complete 
negotiations by 17 March but approval from the European Commission will 
have to be secured before any agreed plan can be put into action. If no 
acceptable bid is received the bank is likely to be nationalised. 
 
21.1.08 Figures from the Council for Mortgage Lenders reveal that gross mortgage 
lending in December 2007, at £22.6 billion, was at its lowest level since May 
2005. 
 
22.1.08 London Scottish Bank, the UK sub-prime lender and debt collector, reveals 
that it had a £13 million shortfall in regulatory capital on 31 January 2007. 
 
24.1.08 Revealed that new mortgage approvals by UK banks fell to an historic low in 
December 2007 of 42,068. This figure is 40 per cent down on the preceding 
year's figure and the lowest figure recorded by the British Bankers 
Association since 1997, when records began. 
 
24.1.08 House of Commons' Treasury Committee publishes its report on Northern 
Rock. 
 
  
29.1.08 FSA warns of a likely dramatic rise in mortgage re-possessions as around 1.4 
million borrowers come to the end of their short-term fixed rate deals. 
 
30.1.08 Chancellor of the Exchequer announces the joint publication by HM Treasury, 
the FSA and the Bank of England of a consultation paper outlining proposals 
for strengthening the framework for financial stability and depositor 
protection. The consultation period ends on 23 April 2008 subsequent to 
which new legislation will be introduced to Parliament. 
 
30.1.08 Mervyn King accepts a second five-year term as Governor of the Bank of 
England removing uncertainty over the future leadership of the Bank. 
 
30.1.08 Bank of England figures confirm the downturn in the UK housing market 
with mortgage approvals falling to 73,000 in December 2007, down by 8,000 
on the previous month's figure and the lowest since the data series was started 
in 1999. 
 
4.2.08  Olivant withdraws from the bidding war for Northern Rock leaving just two 
bidders, the Virgin-led consortium and the Northern Rock's management. 
Their restructuring plans are duly submitted to HM Treasury. 
 
7.2.08  Bank of England cuts Bank Rate by 25 basis points to 5.25 per cent citing a 
deterioration in the outlook for global growth, continuing disruption to global 
financial markets and difficulties faced by borrowers in securing credit as 
reasons for the cut. 
 
7.2.08  The Office for National Statistics re-classified Northern Rock as a public 
corporation because of the degree of control exercised over the firm by the 
Government. The decision will add some £90 billion to public debt causing 
the Government to breach its self-imposed ceiling for public debt of 40 per 
cent of GDP. 
 
8.2.08  The Council of Mortgage Lenders announces that repossessions rose to an 
eight-year high of 27,100 last year, up from 22,400 in 2006. But, at 0.23 per 
cent of outstanding loans, this rate is still only a third of the peak reported in 
1991. 
 
13.2.08  Bradford and Bingley announce full-year sub-prime-related losses for 2007 
of £226 million. 
 
17.2.08  Chancellor of the Exchequer announces that Northern Rock is to be 
nationalised, with a view to returning the bank to the private sector at some 
point in the future. 
 
19.2.08 Barclays announces credit securities-related losses of £1.635 billion for 2007. 
 
 
 19.2.08 Emergency legislation allowing for the nationalisation of Northern Rock 
(excluding its Jersey-based trust, Granite) is introduced to Parliament. 
 
20.2.08 Alliance and Leicester reveals full-year writedowns for 2007 on Treasury 
investments of £185 million. 
 
21.2.08 Government agrees to allow annual reviews of Northern Rock by the Office 
of Fair Trading to assuage fears over potential anti-competitiveness of 
nationalisation in order to speed up the passage of the allied legislation 
through Parliament. The Bill to nationalise Northern Rock (and any other 
bank) subsequently receives the Royal Assent. 
 
22.2.08 Lloyds TSB announces sub-prime-related losses of £280 million for 2007. 
 
26.2.08 Standard Chartered announces sub-prime-related losses of $300 million for 
2007. 
 
27.2.08 HBOS announces sub-prime-related losses of £227 million for 2007. 
 
28.2.08 RBS announces sub-prime-related losses of £2.9 billion for 2007. 
 
29.2.08 Nationwide Building Society reports that UK house prices fell for the fourth 
month in a row in February 2008, slowing annual house price inflation to 2.7 
per cent, the lowest level for two years. 
 
3.3.08  HSBC announces sub-prime-related losses of $17.2 billion for 2007. 
 
5.3.08  Peloton Partners, a London-based hedge fund, announces that its ABS fund is 
now worthless having lost some $2 billion in a matter of days. 
 
6.3.08  Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee leaves Bank Rate unchanged 
at 5.25 per cent. 
 
11.3.08 Bank of England announces it will roll over the £10 billion of three-months 
money offered in December 2007 and will consider providing another $10 
billion next month through a rollover of the January auction's money. 
 
17.3.08 In the wake of the uncertainty generated by the Fed-sanctioned rescue of Bear 
Stearns in the US, the Bank of England, exceptionally, supplies £5 billion of 
three-day money to the market to tide it over until the normal weekly 
refinancing operation is due (i.e. on 20 March 2008). The offer, which was 
provided at the official 5.25 per cent Bank Rate, and was designed to keep 
the overnight rate close to Bank Rate, was nearly five times oversubscribed.  
 
18.3.08 Northern Rock's new business plan, designed to secure the EU Commission's 
blessing, is revealed. The new Board plans to repay the Bank of England's 
loan within three to four years, when it will relinquish its Government 
guarantees, to halve its balance sheet and to cut its workforce by around a 
 
 third by 2011. It will also close its savings operation in Denmark. The bank's 
determination to increase its market share of retail deposits, whilst still 
enjoying the Government guarantees, irked both banks and building societies, 
however. 
 
26.3.08 FSA publishes an executive summary of the review carried out by its internal 
audit division into its supervision of Northern Rock together with 
recommendations for change and the management's response. 
 
26.3.08 Governor of the Bank of England, in an appearance before the Treasury Select 
Committee, warns of tighter regulation, in the form of tougher capital and 
liquidity requirements, and more intensive monitoring as the price the banks 
will have to pay for enjoying access to central bank emergency liquidity 
support. 
 
26.3.08 British and US Governments agree to set up a UK-US 'Working Group' to 
develop proposals for enhanced monitoring and regulation of the banking 
sector. 
 
31.3.08 Northern Rock reports a £167.6 million loss for 2007 after making £410 
million of writedowns on Treasury assets and trebling bad debt provisions to 
£240 million. It also announces a determination to repay £23 billion of the 
£24 billion outstanding loan to the Bank of England by end-2009, with the 
final £1 billion being repaid by end-2010. The repayment plans are 
predicated on the bank's ability to shed 60 per cent of its mortgage holders 
and cut its staff by a third, and are dependent upon the future state of the 
housing market. It still expects to be in the red in 2011. 
 
3.4.08  Bank of England's first quarter Credit Conditions Survey reveals a further 
tightening of the credit squeeze as secured leading to both households and 
companies is forecast to fall further in the second quarter of 2008. On the 
mortgage front, the squeeze is reflected in a marked slowdown in lending and 
rising rates with some providers limiting loans to existing customers and/or 
local clients, and charging differential rates according to the size of deposit 
put down. 
 
8.4.08  Bank of England announces it will raise the amount of three-months money 
injected into the system from £10 billion to £15 billion when it rolls over 
January's injection next week. 
 
8.4.08  The Halifax, the UK's biggest mortgage lender, claims the average price of a 
house in the UK fell by 2.5 per cent (1 per cent on a quarterly basis) in March 
2008, the first year-on-year fall since 1996 and the biggest monthly fall 
recorded since September 1992. 
 
9.4.08  UK banks raise 'target reserve balances' at the Bank of England to £23.54 
billion (from £20 billion) in a sign of increasing nervousness about the 
impact of the credit crisis. 
 
  
10.4.08 Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England cuts Bank Rate from 
5.25 per cent to 5 per cent against a background of tightening credit 
conditions and reduced availability of credit. 
 
21.4.08 Bank of England reveals a new Special Liquidity Scheme under which it will 
swap Treasury bills for securities backed by mortgages made before 
1 January 2008 or credit card debts for a period of up to 364 days. Up to £50 
billion will be available (for both banks and large building societies) and the 
scheme may be extended for an additional two years, if required, with closure 
ensuing by October 2011 at the latest. The purpose of the scheme is to 
remove the fear of bank insolvencies arising from illiquidity, thereby 
stimulating interbank lending, to ease liquidity problems (the Treasury bills 
are readily saleable and can be used as collateral, unlike the mortgage-backed 
securities stuck on the institutions' balance sheets) and, as a side effect, may 
bring down three-month interbank rates. Contrary to Government assertions, 
the scheme is not designed to boost new mortgage lending or prevent a 
housing market correction, nor to bail out weak banks or building societies 
(the capital markets should be tapped to address solvency issues). As for 
taxpayers, their interests are protected by forcing the banks to retain all of the 
credit risk on their ABS (value-impaired securities must be replaced with 
additional triple A-rated securities or the Treasury bills otherwise returned 
immediately); only triple A-rated paper will be accepted by the Bank; the 
ABS accepted by the Bank will be subject to a discount (or "haircut") on their 
market value of between 1p. and 20p. in the pound, the Bank having the right 
to change the size of the discounts on a daily basis; and the Bank charging 
the banks entering into the swap arrangements a fee, calculated as the gap 
between the three-month LIBOR rate and the secured three-month gilt repo 
rate, subject to a minimum charge of 0.2%. 
 
22.4.08 Royal Bank of Scotland announces a £12 billion rights issue, the largest in 
European history, to shore up its capital in the wake of £5.9 billion of 
writedowns on sub-prime assets and a disappointing performance from ABN 
Amro, the bank acquired in August 2007. 
 
23.4.08 British Bankers Association reports that mortgage approvals in March 2008, 
at 35,417, were the lowest since the series began in 1997 and represented a 
drop of 18 per cent on February 2008's figure and of 46 per cent on the 
previous year's corresponding figure. 
 
29.4.08 Bank of England figures confirm the fall in mortgage approvals for new home 
purchases in March 2008. At 64,000, the figure was down by 11 per cent on 
February 2008's figure, and around half the peak figure recorded in 
November 2006. 
 
29.4.08 HBOS announces £2.84 billion of first quarter writedowns on complex debt 
securities and a £4 billion rights issue to strengthen its capital base. 
 
 
 30.4.08 Figures from the Nationwide Building Society confirm the first annual fall in 
house prices for 12 years, with average prices in April 1 per cent lower than 
12 months earlier and 4 per cent lower than their peak in October 2007. 
 
12.5.08 The HSBC announces that it has set aside a further $5.8 billion due to the 
credit turmoil in the first quarter of 2008. 
 
13.5.08 The UK's CPI figure for April 2008 hits 3 per cent, right at the limit of 
tolerance allowed under the inflation targeting regime, underlining the Bank's 
limited ability to support the real economy through further cuts in interest 
rates. 
 
13.5.08 The Alliance and Leicester announces a further £192 million of writedowns 
on its Treasury assets. 
 
15.5.08 Market sources suggest UK banks are hoping to swap up to £90 billion of 
mortgage-backed assets for Treasury bills with the Bank of England under its 
Special Liquidity Scheme, compared with the £50 billion of swaps initially 
envisaged by the Bank. 
 
15.5.08 Barclays Bank reveals debt securities writedowns of £1.7 billion for the first 
quarter of 2008. 
 
30.5.08 According to the Nationwide's house price index, UK house prices suffered 
their biggest annual fall in May 2008, of 4.4 per cent, since December 1992, 
when the market was last in a downturn. 
 
2.6.08  Bradford and Bingley announces that it would make losses of £8 million in 
the first four months of 2008 because of rising arrears on its mortgage book 
(overburdened by buy-to-let and self-certified mortgages) and a squeeze on 
net interest margins. It also said that, because of dramatic changes in trading 
conditions over the past three weeks, it has proved necessary to lower the 
rights issue price from 82p. to 55p. and to raise the total amount of funding 
sought from £300 million to £400 million, 23 per cent to be taken by the US 
private equity investor TPG. 
 
2.6.08  Bank of England data show that mortgage approvals have more than halved 
since their peak at end-2006. At 58,000, the end-April 2008 figures are 55 per 
cent below the peak of nearly 130,000 and the lowest since such records 
began in 1999. 
 
4.6.08  The European Commission expresses serious reservations about the 
Government's restructuring package for Northern Rock in its first assessment 
of the plan published in its official journal, the 'Official List'. In particular, it 
expresses concerns about the length of time the restructuring plan lasts for, 
the extent of state aid provided and the distortions created to market 
competition. 
 
 
 5.6.08  Chancellor of the Exchequer announces plans to establish a 'financial stability 
committee' comprising City experts to advise the Governor of the Bank of 
England on financial stability issues. 
 
5.6.08  According to the Halifax's house price index, house prices fell for a fourth 
consecutive month in May 2008. The 2.4 per cent fall meant prices fell by 
over 6 per cent compared with one year earlier. 
 
10.6.08 Governor of the Bank of England announces plans to create a permanent 
system of liquidity support for troubled banks, additional to the existing 
'standing facility'. This will be the successor to the 'special liquidity scheme' 
introduced in April 2008. 
 
17.6.08 Governor of the Bank of England has to write a second letter to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining why the CPI (at 3.3 per cent in May 
2008 and widely expected to rise to over 4 per cent) exceeds the 'permitted' 
boundary of 1 per cent either side of the inflation target of 2 per cent. 
19.6.08 In a Press Release (HM Treasury, 2008), the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
unveils proposals for enhancing the role of the Bank of England in preserving 
financial stability. They embrace, inter alia, providing a statutory 
responsibility for financial stability for the Bank, establishing a new 
Financial Stability Committee of the Court of Directors, and giving it a 
leading role in the implementation of the new 'Special Resolution Regime' 
should it be triggered by the FSA. The new legislation, in the form of a 
Banking Reform Bill, is expected to take effect in Spring 2009. 
 
24.6.08 Data released by the British Bankers Association reveals mortgage approvals 
by the banks fell during May 2008 by 56 per cent compared with a year 
earlier. At just under 28,000, the figure is the lowest since the data series 
began in 1997. 
 
25.6.08 Barclays announces plans to raise £4.5 billion of new capital through a share 
placement to boost capital ratios and finance new investments. New investors 
will include the sovereign wealth fund the Qatari Investment Authority and 
the country's Prime Minister, who will take up to 10 per cent between them, 
and Japan's Mitsui Banking Corporation, which will take a 2 per cent stake. 
Existing shareholders making further investments include Temasek of 
Singapore and the China Development Bank. 
 
27.6.08 Shares in Bradford and Bingley fall by over 20 per cent following the Board's 
rebuffal of entrepreneur Clive Cowdery's proposed rescue deal by his 
Resolution vehicle. 
 
30.6.08 Bank of England figures for mortgage approvals for house purchase during 
May 2008 confirm the downwards trend revealed by the narrower dataset of 
the British Bankers Association. The fall to 42,000, from 58,000 in April, 
represents a 64 per cent decrease on the previous year's figure. 
 
  
1.7.08  The Nationwide's house price index reveals that, after five straight months of 
decline, UK house prices in June 2008 were 6.4 per cent lower than a year 
earlier, with all regions of England and Wales registering falls. 
 
1.7.08  HM Treasury reveals its latest plans for financial stability and depositor 
protection by way of another consultation document. On the latter front, de 
jure protection is planned to rise to £50,000, on a gross basis, with no co-
insurance applying; and compensation is expected to be effected within seven 
days of a bank being unable to repay. At least for now, banks will not be 
asked to fund an ex-ante scheme; and the new Scheme will have emergency 
access to Government funding. 
 
3.7.08  A downgrading by Moody's of Bradford and Bingley's credit rating – from A2 
(the level to which it was downgraded after the profits warning) to Baa1, the 
lowest rating for any UK bank – throws into doubt the funding sought from 
TPG Capital. 
4.7.08  Taking advantage of a "get-out" clause, TPG Capital pulls out of a deal to 
inject £179 million into Bradford and Bingley following Moody's credit 
downgrading of the bank a day earlier. This causes the bank to revamp its 
£400 million fund-raising efforts for a third time in three weeks, calling upon 
a group of existing shareholders to replace the £179 million investment 
previously sought from TPG through an enlarged (to £400 million) rights 
issue. Under FSA pressure, the regulator being desperate to avoid another 
banking casualty, Legal and General, M&G, Standard Life and Insight 
Investments, agreed to ride to the rescue. Shares in the bank duly fell by 18 
per cent to 50p., 5p. below the rights issue price. 
 
7.7.08  Bradford and Bingley's share price falls by a further 16 per cent to a new low 
of 42p., 13p. below the 55p.-a-share rights issue price, threatening heavy 
losses for the underwriters and sub-underwriters. 
 
8.7.08  Shares in Bradford and Bingley fall to a new low of 33p. as investors question 
the bank's long-term value despite the regulator's apparent happiness with the 
bank's capital adequacy and funding positions. 
 
10.7.08 Halifax house price index reveals a further fall in UK house prices of 2 per 
cent in June leaving them 8.6 per cent lower than a year earlier. 
 
11.7.08 The Spanish bank, Banco Santander, makes a £1.26 billion bid for the 
Alliance and Leicester. 
 
14.7.08 Board of Alliance and Leicester recommends Banco Santander's bid. 
 
16.7.08 The number of people claiming unemployment benefit in June 2008 is 
revealed to have jumped by 5,500 to 840,100, the fifth consecutive monthly 
rise. 
 
  
21.7.08 HBOS, the UK's biggest mortgage lender, reveals only 8.3 per cent of its 
investors took up their allocations in the rights issue, leaving the underwriters 
and sub-underwriters nursing hefty paper losses. 
 
22.7.08 The Tripartite Authorities reveal their plans for the new 'Special Resolution 
Regime'. 
 
29.7.08 The 'Crosby Report' on the UK mortgage market is published. No quick 'fixes' 
for the market's problems are recommended; the main contenders all involve 
undesirable subsidies and/or distortions. 
 
29.7.08 Bank of England figures reveal that mortgage approvals fell to 36,000 in June 
from 41,000 in May, confirming the continued contraction in the UK 
residential market. 
 
30.7.08 Lloyds TSB announces a 70 per cent fall in pre-tax profits to £599 million for 
the first half of 2008. A £585 million writedown on its structured portfolio 
was partly responsible for the fall in profits. 
 
31.7.08 HBOS, the largest UK mortgage lender, announces a 72 per cent fall in pre-
tax profits to £848 million for the first half of 2008 after making a £1.09 
billion sub-prime-related writedown. 
 
31.7.08 Alliance and Leicester announces a 99 per cent crash in pre-tax profits to just 
£2 million for the first half of 2008 following a £143 sub-prime writedown 
and £209 million of losses on toxic securities. 
 
31.7.08 Figures released by the Nationwide Building Society reveal that UK house 
price falls are accelerating. House prices were revealed to be 8.1 per cent 
lower in July than a year go, representing the fastest monthly fall since 
figures were produced in 1991. 
 
4.8.08  HSBC announces half-year pre-tax profits for 2008 of $10.2 billion, down 28 
per cent on the previous year, following a writedown of $3.9 billion on credit 
market exposures. 
 
5.8.08  Northern Rock reports half year losses of £585 million due to rising arrears – 
up to 1.18 per cent of mortgage advances at end-June 2008 compared with 
0.45 per cent at end-December 2007 – and rising repossessions (up 67 per 
cent to 3,710 during the same period) which contributed to a bad debt charge 
of £238 million. The bank also reveals that, during the first half of 2008, it 
has managed to reduce the Bank of England loan by £9.4 billion, from £26.9 
billion to £17.5 billion, and that this will fall by a further £3 billion during the 
rest of 2008 once the debt is converted to equity by the Government (a 
further £400 million of preference shares may also be converted into equity). 
The debt-for-equity swap has proved necessary because of the impairment of 
 
 the bank's capital, its core equity Tier 1 ratio falling to only 2.9 per cent by 
end-June 2008. 
 
5.8.08  FSA figures reveal that repossessions of UK houses have risen by more than 
40 per cent – from 6,471 to 9,152 – during the first quarter of 2008 compared 
with the same period one year earlier, with the number of home loans in 
arrears also increasing by nearly 40,000 to over 300,000, during the same 
period. The number of loans in arrears, however, still accounts for only 2.44 
per cent of total loan book balances, with just 1.97 per cent of outstanding 
loans being represented by repossessions. 
 
7.8.08  Barclays announces a 33 per cent fall in first-half pre-tax profits to £2.75 
billion after taking a £2.8 billion writedown on its complex debt securities. 
 
7.8.08  Halifax's house price index reveals a 10.9 per cent fall in house prices in July 
2008 compared with one year earlier. 
 
8.8.08  Royal Bank of Scotland reveals a half year pre-tax loss of £691 million 
compared with a profit of £5.11 billion the previous year after taking a £5.9 
billion writedown on sub-prime-related assets. 
 
8.8.08  Council of Mortgage Lenders reveals that the number of houses repossessed 
by its members jumped by 41 per cent in the second half of 2008 to 18,900. 
 
10.8.08 Figures from the Building Societies Association reveal that net lending (i.e. 
new loans less redemptions) was negative to the tune of nearly £700 million 
in June 2008, following a negative figure of £110 million in May 2008. 
 
12.8.08 Publication of the inflation figures for July 2008 reveals that the CPI stood at 
a 16-year high of 4.4 per cent, more than double the government's target. 
 
13.8.08 Publication of the latest unemployment figures reveals that the unemployment 
rate rose to 5.4 per cent in July 2008 with the number of people claiming 
unemployment benefit rising at the fastest rate for almost 16 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 3.  THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM'S RECOMMENDED 
ACTIONS FOR ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL 
RESILIENCE (FSF, 2008) 
    
 
 
I Measures designed to strengthen the prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk 
management. 
 
1. Capital requirements 
 
• The Basel Committee will issue proposals in 2008 to: 
 
 - raise capital requirements for certain complex structured credit products such as 
CDOs of ABS; 
 - introduce, together with IOSCO, additional capital requirements for credit 
exposures in the banks' and securities firms' trading books; and 
 - strengthen the capital treatment for banks' liquidity facilities to OBS ABCP 
conduits. 
 
• Supervisors will assess the impact of Basel II implementation on banks' capital levels 
and will decide whether additional capital buffers are necessary. 
 
• Supervisors will continue to update the risk parameters and other provisions of Basel 
II and will rigorously assess banks' compliance with the framework. They will assess 
the cyclicality of the Basel II framework. 
 
• Insurance supervisors should strengthen the regulatory and capital framework for 
monoline insurers in relation to structured credit. 
 
2. Liquidity management 
 
• The Basel Committee will issue for consultation sound practice guidance on the 
management and supervision of liquidity by July 2008 (it was actually issued on 
17 June 2008 – see Basel Committee, 2008b). It will cover the following areas: 
 
 - the identification and measurement of the full range of liquidity risks, including 
contingent liquidity risk associated with OBS vehicles; 
 - stress tests, including greater emphasis on market-wide stresses and the linkage of 
stress tests to contingency funding plans; 
 - the role of supervisors, including communication and co-operation between 
supervisors, in strengthening liquidity risk management practices; 
 - the management of intra-day liquidity risks arising from payment and settlement 
obligations, both domestically and across borders; 
 - cross-border flows and the management of foreign currency liquidity risk; and 
 - the role of disclosure and market discipline in promoting improved liquidity risk 
management practices. 
 
  
• National supervisors should closely check banks' implementation of the updated 
guidance as part of their regular supervision and take appropriate remedial action, as 
necessary. 
 
• Supervisors and central banks will examine the scope for additional steps to promote 
more robust and internationally-consistent liquidity approaches for cross-border banks. 
This will include the scope for more convergence about liquidity supervision as well as 
central bank liquidity operations. 
 
3. Supervisory oversight of risk management, including of OBS entities 
 
• Generally, firms' boards and senior management must strengthen risk management 
practices according to the lessons they have learned from the turmoil. Supervisors for 
their part should act to monitor the progress of banks and securities firms in 
strengthening risk management and capital planning practices. 
 
• National supervisors will use the flexibility within Basel II to ensure that risk 
management, capital buffers and estimates of potential credit losses are appropriately 
forward-looking and take account of uncertainties associated with models, valuations 
and concentration risks and expected variations through the cycle. 
 
• The Basel Committee will issue further guidance for supervisory review over the 
course of 2008/2009 in a number of areas designed to: 
  
 - strengthen guidance relating to the management of firm-wide risks, including 
concentration risks; 
 - strengthen stress testing guidance for risk management and capital planning 
purposes; 
 - ensure banks manage OBS exposure appropriately; 
 - strengthen risk management relating to the securitisation business; and 
 - strengthen existing guidance on the management of exposures to leveraged 
counterparties. 
 
4. Operational infrastructure for OTC derivatives 
 
Market participants should act promptly to ensure that the settlement, legal and operational 
infrastructure underlying OTC derivatives markets is sound. 
 
 
II Measures designed to enhance transparency and valuation. 
 
1. Risk disclosure by market participants 
 
Enhanced disclosures by financial firms of more meaningful and consistent quantitative 
and qualitative information about risk exposure, valuations, OBS entities and related 
policies are necessary to help restore market confidence. By 2009, the Basel Committee 
will issue further guidance to strengthen disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 of Basel II 
 
 for securitisation exposures, sponsorship of OBS vehicles, liquidity commitments to 
ABCP conduits, and valuations. 
 
2. Accounting and disclosure standards for OBS vehicles 
 
The IASB should promptly improve the accounting and disclosure standards for OBS 
vehicles and work with other standard setters toward international convergence. 
 
3. Valuation 
 
Given the potential weaknesses in valuation practices and disclosures, and the difficulties 
associated with fair valuation in circumstances in which markets become unavailable, 
which became apparent during the turmoil, there is a clear need for international standard 
setters to enhance accounting, disclosure and audit guidance for valuations. Firms' 
valuation processes and related supervisory guidance should also be enhanced. For its part, 
the Basel Committee will issue for consultation guidance to enhance the supervisory 
assessment of banks' valuation processes and to reinforce sound practices in 2008. 
 
4. Transparency in securitisation processes and markets 
 
In the light of recent events, it is clear that market practices regarding initial and on-going 
disclosures relating to structured products, both in public and private markets, need to be 
improved. Accordingly, securities market regulators will work with market participants to 
this end, with IOSCO assessing the progress made by end-2008. 
 
 
III Measures designed to enhance the role played by credit rating agencies (CRAs). 
 
Given that poor credit assessments by CRAs contributed both to the build-up to and the 
unfolding of recent events, there is a clear need to improve the performance of CRAs. 
Whilst CRAs have themselves taken action to improve internal governance and 
operational practices in the light of recent events, more needs to be done. 
 
1. Quality of the rating process 
 
CRAs need to improve the quality of the rating process and their management of conflicts 
of interest when rating structured products. To this end: 
 
• IOSCO will revise its "Code of Conduct Fundamentals" for CRAs by mid-2008; 
 
• CRAs should quickly revise their codes of conduct to implement the revised IOSCO 
code; and 
 
• national authorities, individually or collectively, should monitor the implementation of 
the revised code to ensure that CRAs speedily adopt it. 
 
2. Differentiated ratings and expanded information on structured products 
 
 
 • CRAs should clearly differentiate, either with a different rating scale or with additional 
symbols, the ratings used for structured products from those for corporate bonds given 
their differing credit risk properties. 
 
• CRAs should expand the initial and on-going information that they provide on the risk 
characteristics of structured products. 
 
3. CRA assessment of underlying data quality 
 
A variety of measures are recommended with a view to ensuring that CRAs enhance their 
review of the quality of the data input and of the due diligence performed on underlying 
assets by originators, arrangers and issuers involved in structured products. 
 
4. Use of ratings by investors and regulators 
 
• Investors need to ensure that they are not overly-reliant on ratings. Ratings should not 
replace appropriate risk analysis and management; and risk analysis should be 
commensurate with the complexity of the structured product and the materiality of the 
investor's holding. 
 
• For their part, authorities should check that the roles that they have assigned to ratings 
in regulations and supervisory rules are consistent with the objectives of having 
investors make independent judgment of risks and perform their own due diligence, 
and that they do not induce uncritical reliance on credit ratings as a substitute for that 
independent evaluation. 
 
 
IV Measures designed to strengthen the authorities' responsiveness to risk. 
 
Given that some of the weaknesses that have come to light were known or suspected 
within the community/financial authorities, there is a clear need to enhance the authorities' 
responsiveness to risk. 
 
1. Translating risk analysis into action 
 
Supervisors, regulators and central banks – individually and collectively – need to take 
additional steps to more effectively translate their risk analysis into actions that mitigate 
those risks. Accordingly: 
 
• supervisors should see that they have the requisite resources and expertise to oversee 
the risks associated with financial innovation and to ensure that firms they supervise 
have the capacity to understand and arrange the risks; and 
 
• supervisors and regulators should formally communicate to firms' boards and senior 
management at an early stage any concerns they might have about risk exposures and 
the quality of risk management and ensure appropriate remedial action by the firms. 
 
2. Improving information exchange and co-operation among authorities 
 
  
• The use of international colleges of supervisors should be expanded so that, by end-
2008, a college exists for each of the largest global financial institutions. Supervisors 
involved in these colleges should conduct an exercise, by 2009, to draw lessons about 
good practices in operating colleges. 
 
• Supervisory exchange of information and co-ordination in the development of best 
practice benchmarks should be improved at both national and international levels. 
 
• Supervisors and central banks should improve co-operation and the exchange of 
information, including in the assessment of financial stability risks. The exchange of 
information should be rapid during periods of market strain. 
 
• To facilitate central bank mitigation of market liquidity strains, large banks will be 
required to share their liquidity contingency plans with relevant central banks. 
 
3. Enhancing international bodies' policy work 
 
• International regulatory, supervisory and central bank committees will strengthen their 
prioritisation of issues and, for difficult-to-resolve issues, establish mechanisms for 
escalating them to a senior decision-making level. 
 
• National supervisors will, as part of their regular supervision, take additional steps to 
check the implementation of guidance issued by international committees. 
 
• The FSF will encourage joint strategic reviews by standard-setting committees to 
better ensure policy development is co-ordinated and focussed on priorities. 
 
• The FSF and IMF will intensify their co-operation on financial stability. The IMF will 
report the findings from its monitoring of financial stability risks to FSF meetings, and 
in turn will seek to incorporate relevant FSF conclusions into its own bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance work. 
 
 
V. Measures designed to improve arrangements for dealing with stress in the financial 
system. 
 
1. Central bank operations 
 
• To meet an increased but uncertain demand for reserves, monetary policy operational 
frameworks should be capable of quickly and flexibly injecting substantial quantities 
of reserves without running the risk of driving overnight rates substantially below 
policy targets for significant periods of time. 
 
• Policy frameworks should include the capability to conduct frequent operations against 
a wide range of collateral, over a wide range of maturities and with a wide range of 
 
 counterparties, which should prove especially useful in dealing with extraordinary 
situations. 
 
• Central banks should have the capacity to use a variety of instruments when illiquidity 
of institutions or markets threatens financial stability or the efficacy of monetary 
policy. 
 
• To deal with stressed situations, central banks should consider establishing 
mechanisms designed for meeting frictional funding needs that are less subject to 
stigma. 
 
• To deal with problems of liquidity in foreign currency, central banks should consider 
establishing standing swap lines among themselves. In addition, central banks should 
consider allowing in their own liquidity operations the use of collateral across borders 
and currencies. 
 
2. Arrangements for dealing with weak banks 
 
• Domestically, authorities need to review and, where needed, strengthen legal powers 
and clarify the division of responsibilities of different national authorities for dealing 
with weak and failing banks. 
 
• Internationally, authorities should accelerate work to share information on national 
arrangements for dealing with problem banks and catalogue cross-border issues, and 
then to decide how to address the identified challenges. 
 
• Authorities should agree a set of international principles for deposit insurance systems. 
National deposit insurance arrangements should be reviewed against these agreed 
international principles, and authorities should strengthen arrangements where needed. 
 
• For the largest cross-border financial firms, the most directly involved supervisors and 
central banks should establish a small group to address specific cross-border crisis 
management planning issues. It should hold its first meeting before end-2008. 
 
• Authorities should share international experiences and lessons about crisis 
management. These experiences should be used as the basis to extract some good 
practices of crisis management that are of wide international relevance. 
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